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The Diversity of Assimilation: Case Studies of the
Early Reservation Years, 1867-1901
Director: Dr. H. Duane Hampton H  Q , _ k \
The responses of the Kiowas, Comanches, Southern Cheyennes, 
Southern Arapahoes, Santee and Yanktonais Sioux to the post- 
Civil War U.S. assimilation policy demonstrate the persistence of 
native traditions. The experiences of these five tribes are 
compared as they formed new relationships with government agents 
and other Indians, faced encroaching non-Indian populations, 
and adjusted to farming, ranching, and other novel economic 
activities on the semi-arid Great Plains. Although the native 
economic and political institutions were destroyed during the 
wars of the 1870s, the tribal remnants were able to maintain 
and to perpetuate their social and religious traditions.
The assimilation policy sought to transform nomadic hunters 
and warriors into Christianized yeoman farmers. Ulysses S.
Grant's Peace Policy aligned the government with the Christian 
denominations to establish schools, missions, and programs leading 
to the allotment of Indian land in severalty. Eastern reformers 
and westerners hungry for more land hoped that acculturation 
would lead the Indians to drop their tribal relations within 
twenty-five years. With the nuclear Indian family working an 
individual farm, surplus reservation land could then be opened 
to White settlement.
The principal sources used were the Annual Reports of The 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the Annual Reports of the Board 
of -Indian Commissioners, and the published microfilm edition 
of the James McLaughlin papers. Although the Indians' own words 
are missing from these reports, their presence is not. The 
assimilation policy the agent was attempting to implement is 
clearly stated, as are his frustrations with the various forms 
of traditional Indian culture which persist despite his efforts 
to prohibit them. Complaints of one tribe or band visiting another, 
Indian ceremonies, give-aways, polygamy, camp living, and tr a d i ­
tional styles of dress and hair length are scattered throughout 
the agency reports. While this study ends at 1901, thirty years 
were to pass before Indian self-determination was taken seriously 
in the making of federal Indian policy.
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INTRODUCTION
For forty years before the Civil War in America, 
clashes between Indians and Whites east of the Mississippi 
River were settled or sometimes avoided by removing the 
tribes westward beyond the frontier of White settlement. 
There, government agents regulated trade and encouraged the 
Indians to farm so that they might one day assimilate into 
the Europeanized American lifestyle.
With his inauguration as President in 1869, Ulysses 
S. Grant gave official sanction to a revised approach to 
American Indian policy made necessary by increased 
transcontinental commercial activity and the movement of 
pioneer families westward. The continued segregation of 
Native Americans from the rest of the population was no 
longer feasible. Grant's so called "Peace Policy" involved 
transferring the administration of the Indian reservations 
out of the hands of politically appointed government agents 
and turning it over to the representatives of America's 
Christian denominations. (It was even called the Quaker 
Policy, early on, since the Quakers were the most active 
demonination at its inception.) The agent's job was to 
convince the Indians to forsake their tribal relations, 
adhere to Christianity, and begin family farms on individual
1
2
plots of land. Indian reservations, greatly reduced in size 
to accommodate individual homesteads, would serve as the 
training ground for this experiment in acculturation until 
the reservations themselves could be opened to White 
settlement.
The purpose of this study is to examine how the 
Kiowas, Comanches, Southern Cheyennes, Southern Arapahoes, 
and bands of the Santee and Yanktonais Sioux responded to 
United States assimilation policy between 1867 and 1901. It 
will be important to become familiar with the unique 
experience of each tribe in order to understand to what 
extent it did or did not benefit from the government's 
sincere efforts on its behalf. American politicians and 
reformers of the time confidently presumed that by the end 
of the century they could simply replace Indian tribal 
values with the individualistic ethos of.the expanding 
nation. Such a clear transformation did not take place.
What occurred were complex changes that depended for the 
most part on the natural and human environments, the 
personality of the government agent, and socio-political 
character of the particular tribe. In all cases the Indians 
used their ability to pick and choose from the new culture 
being placed before them) integrating the traits they deemed 
most useful in their greatly altered circumstances, while at 
the same time remaining rooted in their own traditions.
3
Chapter I will trace the development of Grant's Peace 
Policy in the 1870s, and will show the results of its 
initial application on the three reservations by the church- 
supported Indian agents. Chapter II will show that most of 
these tribes had accepted the fact of the reservations by 
the 1880s, and had come to terms with it, each in their own 
selective manner. Chapter III will examine the goal of the 
assimilation policy— the allotment of Indian lands in 
severalty (individual landholdings). The idea of allotment 
and its emergence in the Dawes Act (1887) will also be 
discussed, as will its effect upon these five tribes through 
the 1890s. The conclusion will provide an evaluation of the 
assimilation policy on these reservations.
CHAPTER I
CONQUEST BY KINDNESS
In 1867 and 1868 representatives of the United States 
government met in council with leaders of the nomadic Indian 
tribes of the Great Plains to ensure safe transportation 
routes for Americans moving west. Treaties emerged out of 
these councils wherein those Indians who signed them agreed 
to exchange most of their vast hunting grounds for protected 
reservations and a government program of acculturation, 
leading to their eventual assimilation as citizens of the 
United States. It is doubtful that the segments of the 
tribes who participated in the treaty making process 
understood that the government's ultimate goal was to end 
all traditional Indian claims to communal landholding and to 
transform plains cultures of hunter-warriors into a uniform 
group of Christianized yeoman farmers. After the signing of 
past treaties there had always been enough buffalo to hunt 
and American pioneers had not yet settled on the plains.
Now, however, the size of the reservations were greatly 
reduced, the buffalo were disappearing, and White settlers 
were fast filling the Great Plains.
4
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Members of America's Christian religious denominations 
became the first Indian agents under President Ulysses S. 
Grant's Peace Policy of 1869. Their goal during the early 
reservation years was to teach the 3Rs to the Indian 
children and to encourage Indian families to become farmers 
on individual allotments of land. In western Indian 
Territory, later to become part of Oklahoma, Agent Lawrie 
Tatum brought the Peace Policy to the Kiowas, Comanches, and 
Kiowa-Apaches. On the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation to the 
north, this process was begun by Brinton Darlington, who was 
followed by John D. Miles. South of Devils Lake in Dakota 
Territory, later North Dakota, Agents William Forbes and 
James McLaughlin brought Grant's Peace Policy to the 
Yanktonais Sioux and the Sisseton, and Wahpeton bands of the 
Santee Sioux. By the end of the 1870s these reservations 
had become established institutions of Indian acculturation 
on the Great Plains.
Over the previous two hundred years European influence 
in America caused major changes to occur in the cultures of 
Native Americans. The horse spread north from the Spanish 
in Mexico through the Great Plains from the middle of the 
seventeenth century, finding its way to the Sioux, near the 
Great Lakes, around 1750. For the five tribes examined in 
this study the possession of the horse greatly increased the 
efficiency with which they could hunt buffalo and other
6
large game, such as elk, deer, and antelope. These animals 
formed the basis of their material culture providing food, 
clothing, skin tepees, utensils and tools, war shields, and 
even river transportation. With increased trade with Whites 
and other tribes, the plains Indians obtained steel knives 
and pots, guns, and glass beads which they quickly adapted 
to their own needs. They also came in contact with liquor 
and European diseases that had devastating results. In 
addition, the use of the horse increased their ability to 
conduct raids for captives and plunder against their Indian 
and White enemies. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries the plains Indians were able to maintain 
continuity between their old ways of life and the 
environments, peoples, and technologies with which they 
came into contact.
While there were similarities in the lifeways of the 
Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Yanktonais and 
Santee Sioux, it would be misleading to ignore their 
differences. For example, they spoke different languages, 
had varied legal, political and social structures, and they 
each had a distinctive style of dress. It is also important 
to understand that each tribe saw itself as unique and often 
superior to all others.
Once the Indians were settled on their reservations 
they came in contact with a variety of non-Indians. The
7
latter were not legally allowed into Indian Territory until 
1889, so the major influence on the tribes in the western 
part, besides agency personnel and traders, was that of the 
cowboys and cattlemen from Texas. The cowboy's transient 
lifestyle was more like the nomadic Indian than the yeoman 
farmer. But beginning in 1889, Kansas farmers from the 
north moved onto the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation, while 
from the south Texans occupied Kiowa-Comanche land. Blacks 
formed twenty-six towns, and Germans, Italians, Syrians, and 
Czechs were among the many immigrant groups who sought their 
fortunes as farmers and merchants in Indian and Oklahoma 
Territories.^" We must also consider the influence of sixty- 
five Indian tribes in the two territories, with a population 
of 64,446 in 1890. Three-fourths of this total were members 
of the Five Civilized Tribes, among whom the forces of 
modernization had predominated over the previous two 
generations.^
In northern Dakota Territory, in the Red River Valley, 
8,000 Norwegians had begun wheat farming by 1880. Highly 
literate and active in politics, the Lutheran Norwegians 
were the largest non-Indian group near the Devils Lake
3Reservation. From the summer of 1884, communities of less
literate Catholic German-Russians began farming south and
4west of the reservation. The non-Indian Americans and 
immigrants who moved west after the Civil War were as much
8
interested in land speculation and merchandising in an urban 
setting as they were in working the land.
But until the 1880s it would be the ideas of reformers 
from the urban northeast, not those of western farmers, 
merchants, and land speculators that would have the greatest 
influence on reservation Indian policy. Through President 
Grant the reformers instigated a broad program of teaching 
the Indians to become agriculturalists and private land 
owners on their isolated reservations. Since the yeoman was 
supposed to embody the essence of the republican virtue 
which Americans valued so highly, it was the obvious place 
to begin the process of acculturating the Indian. America's 
first Secretary of War, Henry Knox, had suggested such an 
idea, and it was implemented on a small scale by President 
James Monroe in 1819. At that time most Americans believed 
that the Indian was doomed through his contact with White 
civilization. But as Americans and newly arrived European 
immigrants filled the west after the Civil War, and the 
Indian had not vanished, the acculturation policy took on 
a greater urgency. It would offer the Indians the virtues
of White Civilization so they could individually combat its
5vices.
The end of the Civil War marked the beginning of an 
ebullient rush by American miners, ranchers, farmers, and 
assorted entrepreneurs east across the Rocky Mountains, and
9
west across the Missouri River to rebuild their lives on the 
Great Plains. Now the men were bringing their women and 
children,signs of hope and permanence. Railroads and 
telegraph lines connected them to new markets in an 
expanding national economy. It seemed that Americans were 
about to fulfill their dream of dominating the continent at 
last. But before this could be achieved, they had to 
confront a human barrier of 225,000 native Americans of the 
plains a'nd Rocky Mountains, who were determined to hold on 
to their vast hunting grounds.
During the presidency of Andrew Johnson a growing 
number of reformers, some of whom were former abolitionists, 
began speaking out against abuses in the administration of 
Indian affairs. Colonel John M. Chivington's November 1864 
attack on Black Kettle's peacful Cheyenne-Arapaho camp in 
southern Colorado showed how tolerant of those abuses 
Americans in the west still were. In response to this, 
Republican Senator James R. Doolittle of Wisconsin, on 
March 3, 1865, succeeded in passing through Congress a joint 
resolution to investigate charges of corruption against the 
frontier army, Indian agents, and White traders.
Their completed report, submitted to Congress on 
January 26, 1867, cited corrupt agents and traders for 
spreading disease, whiskey, and arms among the tribes, 
thereby defeating efforts for peace. It also chastised the
10
frontier army, as well as western newspaper editors and
citizens who supported the army's aggressive posture, and
recommended that the administration of Indian affairs remain
under the Department of the Interior instead of being
transferred back to the War Department. Lastly, the report
suggested that five boards of inspection be appointed to
monitor the effects of Indian policy, and have the power to
correct abuses.^
By the end of 1866 the army had to muster out most of
its volunteers. Since this would leave the cavalry
shorthanded, the commander of the Army in the west, General
William Tecumseh Sherman, was willing to experiment with a
peaceful policy, which, if successful, would be much cheaper
7in the long run. In July 1867, Congress passed a bill
authorizing President Johnson to select a commission of
three army officers and four civilians empowered to make
peace treaties with the plains Indians. General Sherman
reluctantly accepted an appointment to the Peace Commission
even though he and General Alfred Terry would probably be
outvoted 5-2 by Indian sympathizers. At least they were
going out on the plains to talk to the Indians, something he
felt most of the humanitarians were unwilling to do.
Sherman also favored this official hiatus in the fighting to
give the plains army a chance to build itself up for a
8confrontation he thought was inevitable. The plains were
11
going to be cleared for the railroads and White settlers 
one way or another.
In October 1867, the Peace Commission concluded the 
Medicine Lodge Treaty with the Kiowas, Comanches, Arapahoes, 
Southern Cheyennes, and Plains Apaches. The treaty confined 
the movement of these tribes south of the Arkansas River.
In the north, it took another year before a treaty could be 
made with Red Cloud's Sioux. The treaty of November 1868 
kept the Sioux north of the Platte River. In return for 
these restrictions, the Indians were to receive annuities in 
the form of clothing and presents and a farming and education
program leading to their self-support and eventual
- . . . 9assimilation into American society.
Historian Robert M. Utley has said that the 
"evangelical and antimilitary tone" of the Peace Commission's 
report, submitted to the President on January 7, 1868, was 
that of its leader and Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
Nathaniel G. Taylor. Said Utley, "Conquest by kindness 
rather than armed force would be the guiding principle. 
Through wise and benevolent administration the Indian would 
not only be removed from the paths of expansion but also be 
lifted to the grace of U.S. citizenship."'*'0
During this period the Quakers and the Episcopalians, 
led by the Bishop of Minnesota, Henry B. Whipple, joined 
forces in promoting a peaceful policy towards the Indians.
12
At the end of January 1869, both the Orthodox and Hicksite 
Society of Friends had audiences with the President-elect. 
They urged him to raise the status of the Indian Bureau by 
establishing it as a separate department from the Interior 
and War Departments. While Grant did not support this idea, 
he did want to experiment with the Quakers1 suggestions by 
having them appoint the superintendents and agents for the 
Central and Southern Superintendencies.^  This surprised 
many army generals who had previously thought they had 
gained an ally in the White House.
Grant had not really been converted to the Quaker plan
to any great extent. Military men would still be running
most of the agency posts. Where the Quakers were in charge,
a dual approach to Indian administration would be followed.
All Indians within the boundaries of the reservation would
be the responsibility of the Quaker agent. All Indians who
were outside their assigned reservation without the
permission of their agent, would be subject to the
jurisdiction of the army. Thus, it was hoped that this
clearer separation of roles and responsibilities for the
representatives of government policy, would clarify for the
12Indians the choices they had to make.
This dual policy was also meant to calm the renewed 
controversy over the transfer of the control of Indian 
administration from the Department of the Interior back to
13
the War Department. But, on January 23, 1870, Major Eugene
M. Baker led an attack on a Piegan camp in Montana, killing
13120 men and 53 women and children. The outcry by Indian 
sympathizers in speeches and in the eastern press not only 
prevented a transfer bill from passing, but it drove Grant 
to remove the military from control of any of the agencies. 
In July, Congress attempted to regain control of agency 
appointments. Supported by the Board of Indian 
Commissioners, Grant reacted by distributing the seventy- 
three agencies among thirteen Christian denominations.
Thus, a year after Grant's election the Peace Policy had
become a great deal more church-civilian controlled than was
. . . 14originally intended.
The purpose of the Peace Policy was to prepare the
Indian people for the not-too-distant time when they would
be forced to drop their communal lifestyle and religious
observances, lose the protection of their isolated
reservations, and adopt the role of individualized yeoman
farmers. To achieve this no new treaties would be made.
The Indian agent, with help from church personnel, would
attempt to prevent the open expression of Indian culture and
replace it with the institutions and values of Western
civilization.^
14
Kiowas and Comanches
In the Spring of 1869, the Orthodox Society of Friends
nominated Lawrie Tatum, a forty-seven year old Iowa farmer,
to become agent "for the Kiowas and Comanches, who were
wild, blanket Indians, and the Wichita and affiliated bands,
who were partially civilized, some of them wearing citizens
clothes, all located in the southwestern part of Indian
territory [sic]." As Tatum reflected upon his nomination,
he admitted that he "knew little of the duties and
responsibilities devolving upon an Indian agent. But after
considering the subject as best I could in the fear of God,
and after wishing to be obedient to Him, it seemed right to
accept the appointment." When Tatum assumed his duties on
July 1, 1869, the newly completed Fort Sill had not been
16named yet, and the agent's adobe house leaked.
The Kiowa-Comanche Reservation was bounded in the 
north by the Washita River (see map), on the west by the 
north fork of the Red River, on the south by the Red River, 
and on the east by the ninety-eighth meridian. According to 
T. R. Fehrenbach, "This was good, rich country, 5,546 square 
miles of rolling plains, hills, and valleys, 2,968,893 acres 
in all, stretching from the hazy granite slopes of the 
Wichita Mountains to the brush-lined bottoms of the Texas 
boundary." With thirty-one inches of rainfall annually, a 
mild climate, and killing frosts only between November and
15
April, there seemed to be a potential for farming in this
area. Although there was ample large and small game to hunt
within the reservation, the major bison herds roamed to the
17west on the Staked Plains of Texas.
Prior to their contact with Whites, these two tribes
hunted bison on the Staked Plains, and raided together into
Texas and Mexico capturing horses and mules. They often
killed the men and took the women and children as captives.
Bravery and the capturing of horses and scalps established
18a warrior's status within the tribe.
Agent Tatum "felt that his primary mission was to
19convert the Kiowas and Comanches into farmers." General
William B. Hazen, the former superintendent of the southern
reservations, who had run the agency before Tatum was
appointed, had already had a few tracts of land plowed and
had hired a local White farmer to teach the Indians. These
Indians liked vegetables and fruits, especially melons.
They also liked to cook corn by first removing the husks,
20and then burying the corn under hot coals and ashes.
During his first summer as agent, Tatum had land 
plowed for those Indians who wanted to settle and try 
farming. The Kiowas would have nothing to do with it, 
although probably a few Panetethka Comanches and the 
sedentary Wichitas and Caddoes living at Fort Sill were 
more than willing. By winter Tatum had the fields fenced,
16
and had arranged with the Indians to furnish teams for the
spring plowing. As an incentive to remain near the agency
and farm, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs authorized
Tatum to offer sugar and coffee and $1,000 to be divided
among the twenty-five Indian farmers who raised the largest
and best crops each year. To the men this seemed like
women's work, especially when they could be out on the
Staked Plains hunting buffalo or raiding Texans. For the
women, the agent hoped to hire "thirty female cooks to teach
21the Indian women the finer points of domestic life."
Tatum erected a 30' x 60' mission school, and in
February 1871, Josiah and Elizabeth Butler, Quakers from
Ohio, became the first teachers. Since but a few Comanches,
and no Kiowas or Apaches would attend the school, Tatum got
permission to fill it with Caddoes and Wichitas, who had
recently been assigned their own agency, thirty miles to the 
22north.
In order to start teaching the Kiowas, Tatum hoped he
could find someone to live with them in their camps. On
March 30, 1872, Thomas C. Battey, a Quaker from Iowa,
teaching among the Wichitas and Caddoes, heard the Lord say,
according to Tatum, "What if thou should have to go and
2 3sojourn in the Kiowa camps?" It took three attempts 
over a period of eight months for Tatum to convince the 
commissioner of Indian affairs to consent to this unusual
17
"enterprise." Tatum finally received Quaker Superintendent 
Enoch Hoag's backing, convincing him that, "It might be a
means of reducing the number of raids and depredations of
24the Kiowa Indians." The Kiowa chief Kicking Bird helped 
when he visited Battey the day he heard the Lord's voice,
and encouraged him to come to their camp to teach his last
25surviving daughter.
Battey finally opened his school about fifty miles
northwest of the agency, on the Washita River, on January
23, 1873. School opened in a large tent, with "twenty-two
scholars," plus an audience of chiefs, women, and young men.
That first afternoon Battey had trouble.
So many spectators being present who know nothing about 
schools, I found it next to impossible to bring the 
scholars to anything like order. As soon as the 
children attempted to pronounce a word after me from 
the chart, the visitors would burst into a laugh, 
every one talking in a loud voice, so that it was 
utterly impossible to proceed.
He even was threatened by a "middle aged man" in war paint
who came at him "with an uplifted hand-axe." Battey had to
2 6forcibly remove him from the tent.
After a less than auspicious beginning, Kicking Bird 
told Battey that the Caddoes had been telling his Kiowas 
that Battey's bad medicine had made several of their children 
sick. This upset the Kiowas because many of their children 
actually were sick at that time. Furthermore, according to 
Battey, the Kiowas moved their camp every day or two. He
18
gave up holding regular classes, but stayed with the band,
taught some English and the advantages of White civilization,
and learned some of the Kiowa language. He reported a
detailed account of a Kiowa "medicine dance," which the
agent did not attempt to prevent.
In the end, Battey1s journal of his fascinating
experiences in the Kiowa camps contains very few passages
concerning education. He observed humbly, "They usually
listened attentively to my talk, but mostly consider their
27own mode of life far preferable for them." For Tatum,
having Battey in their camp provided him with a crucial
source of intelligence which they would share every two
weeks when Kicking Bird's band came in to the agency for
rations. After eight months among the Kiowas, frustrated
and ailing, this itinerate Quaker teacher moved back to 
28Iowa.
The Kiowas and Comanches could not accept settling 
permanently around the agency when their basic needs were 
not being met there. Tatum gave them permission to cross 
the Red River to hunt buffalo when their rations failed to 
arrive. Usually they did not wait for permission. When 
Tatum first arrived in their country in 1869, about half of 
the Kiowas and two-thirds of the Comanches were off the 
reservation. They had a thriving trade with the Comancheros 
from New Mexico. "In return for whiskey, tobacco, and guns
19
and ammunition, the Kiowas openly bartered cattle, mules,
29and scalps collected on raids into Texas." The Indians
also encouraged White traders to come on the reservation to
30trade horses for whiskey.
The commander at Fort Sill, Colonel Benjamin H.
Grierson, supported Tatum in carrying out the Quaker Policy,
and used his troops to inhibit the whiskey trade. They both
conceived of the reservation as a city of refuge where their
charges could end their warring and raiding lives and begin
learning the republican virtues that came with tilling the 
31soil.
In a bold move, Tatum refused to continue the tradition
of paying ransoms to Indians for White captives, and he
withheld rations from those who continue to raid into Texas.
His previous acquiescence to this policy encourged the
32taking of more captives. He also took the initiative to
disrupt the Indian political structure, by stripping Chief
Big Bow of his rank for participating with White Bear
(Satanta) in an attack on Whites at Salt Creek Prairie in
May 1871. Tatum's increasingly assertive policy upset
visiting Quakers from the Cheyenne-Arapaho Agency, who
observed a military guard present during a ration issue.
"Josiah Butler agreed that Tatum was tempting Divine
33Providence with an exhibition of little faith." But a
mounting number of incidents, including attacks on the
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agency cattle herd and agency employees, convinced Tatum of
the necessity of using the military to carry out the
government's plans. In May 1871, he wrote Superintendent
Enoch Hoag in Lawrence, Kansas, recommending "that in the
future Indian murderers and kidnappers should be delivered
to civil courts for punishment, in the same manner and to
3 4the same extent as if they were White criminals." Later
that year he asked Grierson and Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie
to apprehend some Comanches out on the Staked Plains who had
35taken some White captives. But this Grierson would not do.
As a Quaker, Tatum felt increasing frustration having 
to proceed by using the military to implement the Peace 
Policy. After building schools, plowing land, and offering
f
incentives for farming, the Kiowas and most of the Comanches 
continued to hunt buffalo, trade with the Comancheros, and 
raid Texas settlements. Tatum finally stopped paying ransoms 
to these tribes for the return of White captives and cut off 
rations to the raiders. The commander of Fort Sill, Colonel 
Grierson, also a Quaker, refused to enforce the dual aspect 
of the Peace Policy, that allowed the army to move against 
Indians who left the reservation without permission.
Tatum's peaceful efforts were having almost no effect on the 
still lordly raiders of the southern plains. He resigned in 
the spring of 1873, feeling his authority undermined after 
the parole of White Bear and Big Tree from prison in
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Huntsville, Texas, where they were serving time for their
3 6part in the massacre at Salt Creek Prairie.
Cheyennes and Arapahoes
North of this enclave the Washita River became the
southern boundary of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation. As
part of the Central Superintendency, which included Kansas
and Indian Territories, this reservation also came under the
jurisdiction of the Quakers. The aged Brinton Darlington
became agent of the Upper Arkansas Agency on July 6 , 1869.
When he arrived, there were about thirty-seven lodges of
Cheyennes, led by Little Robe and Eagle Head (Minimic),
camped and receiving rations near Camp Supply, on the North
Canadian River. Over five times that many Cheyennes refused
to live on the reservation or accept rations, preferring to
hunt buffalo on the headwaters of the Washita and Republican 
37Rivers. The Cheyennes and the Arapahoes complained to
Darlington that the boundaries established for them in the
Medicine Lodge Treaty had never been fully explained to
them. They felt that the water of the Salt Fork of the
Arkansas River was "too brackish for their ponies, rendering
38the area unfit for their occupation."
In August 1869 three members of the Special Indian 
Commission, representing Grant's Peace Policy, came to Camp 
Supply to talk with the Indians. The Arapaho chief,' Little 
Raven, told the commissioner that he was willing to remain
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with his people near an agency farther down the North
Canadian? it bothered him to be so near "the thieving Osages
3 9and the Kansas frontier." They wanted traders to be sent
among them, and they insisted on continuing their
traditional warfare against the Pawnees and the Utes.
Chief Stone Forehead (Medicine Arrow), the Cheyenne Keeper
of the Sacred Arrows, agreed with Little Raven, and added
that he would bring the Dog Soldiers in from the north if the
commissioners and-Colonel Nelson, the commander of Camp
Supply, would not inflict reprisals.
President Grant had already considered expanding the
Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation before receiving the report of
the commissioners. By executive order, he declared the new
boundaries to be the Cherokee Outlet on the north (a buffer
between them and Kansas), the Cimarron River and the ninety-
eighth meridian on the east, the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation
on the south, and the Texas state line on the west (see map).
40The expanded reservation contained 4,297,771 acres of land.
Despite the expansion of the reservation boundaries,
and the relocation of the agency headquarters farther east
along the North Canadian in May 1870, only the Arapahoes
settled near the agency in any numbers. The Cheyenne chief
Stone Calf and thirteen lodges moved in, but most of the
Cheyennes stayed away. Bull Bear, the Dog Soldier chief,
and Stone Forehead intended to lead their people north to
41spend the summer of 1870 with the Northern Cheyennes.
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When Agent Darlington approached Little Robe and
Little Raven about farming and schooling for their children
they expressed little interest. At this time the buffalo
were still plentiful, and the Cheyennes were determined to
maintain as much of their traditional lifestyle as they
could. Although the Dog Soldiers, a Cheyenne warrior
society, had been defeated by the Fifth Cavalry, led by
Major Eugene Carr in the summer of 1868, they were not yet
ready to accept the dictates of the White man's civilization.
Some Cheyennes and Arapahoes were willing to take rations
and live peacefully on the reservation, but living as
Christians, farming, and sending their children to school
42held no attraction for them.
Nevertheless, as a Quaker agent of Grant's Peace 
Policy, Darlington wanted to have plowed fields and a school 
ready for those Indians who were ready to use them. He had 
220 acres of prairie broken to raise grain and vegetables, 
and he set up a school with his daughter, Mrs. Elma D. 
Townsend, as teacher and Israel Negus as the agricultural 
instructor. Darlington hoped the Cheyennes would follow 
the example of the Arapaho Big Mouth, who told his people 
how satisfied he was raising corn and how fortunate they 
were to have good White people to help them become farmers. 
But by the fall of 1871, according to Berthrong, "Only two 
Cheyenne families tried agriculture, planting fifteen acres
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of corn and pumpkins. Eight Cheyenne children found their
way into the Quaker school, and these undoubtedly were the
43offspring of mixed bloods or intermarried Whites." With 
an abundance of buffalo still roaming west of the 
reservation, the Cheyennes and Arapahoes preferred to 
provide themselves with meat and skins, and barter their 
robes with traders at Camp Supply.
Agent Darlington became ill in the spring of 1872 
while trying to acquire more arable land east of the
i
reservation for those Indians who wished to begin farming.
He died on May 1, having done .his best to maintain peace
between Indians and Whites. A month later John D. Miles, a
Quaker and Kickapoo agent in Indian Territory, arrived to
44run the Cheyenne-Arapaho Agency. Over the next year and 
a half the peaceful atmosphere of the previous four years 
began to unravel.
The Southern Cheyenne Sun Dance of June 1873 was 
probably their last as a buffalo hunting people. White 
hunters interested in supplying the eastern market for 
hides, shot approximately 7,500,000 buffaloes between 1872 
and 1874. In addition to this, unlicensed White and Osage 
traders demoralized the Cheyennes with whiskey and arms in 
exchange for their ponies. Even when Agent Miles and 
Colonel J. W. Davidson caught eight whiskey peddlers in 
southern Kansas, the district attorney at Topeka did not 
prosecute them. These concurrent problems led to the Red
240-
River War, and the defeat suffered by the tribes of western
Indian Territory ended their free roaming days outside their 
45reservations.
According to Loring Benson Priest, Miles, more than
other Quaker employees of the Indian Serivce, was able to
combine "power and a rare practicality" with sincerity. In
other words, "he frequently sacrificed his principles to 
46necessity." The use of force against the Indians of the 
southern plains had broken the spirit of the Quaker 
involvement in the Peace Policy. Now that the Cheyennes and 
Arapahoes were completely dependent on the agency for 
survival, Miles' administrative abilities would be severely 
tested.
One of the problems was feeding the 1,650 Arapahoes
and 1,662 Cheyennes on the reservation in the spring of
1875. Congress granted Miles only half of his five million
pounds of beef for the 1875-1876 fiscal year, and they
reduced his annuity funds as well. In addition, Texas beef
contractors habitually misrepresented the amount of edible
47beef on the cattle they drove to the agency. Determined 
that his charges would not starve, Miles defied the wishes 
of the army officers by providing arms to his Indians so 
they could hunt whatever buffalo remained west of the 
reservation. By the winter of 1877-1878, there were almost 
no buffalo left. To supplement this loss Miles bought beef
25
from Texas cattlemen, who had begun to drive their herds 
across the reservation to railheads in Kansas (see 
Chapter 2).
The Cheyennes and Arapahoes began to find their own
ways of making a living. The agency traders procured
buffalo hides for the women to tan and cure. In their first
year they produced about 5,000 hides. The traders paid the
women $3.00 in credit for each hide tanned. This provided
$15,000 worth of food and other supplies for them and their
families. In another enterprising effort, Powder Face's
band of Arapahoes began trading buffalo robes and ponies for
cattle along the Chisholm Trail, which ran east of the
4 8agency (now called Darlington).
In the summer of 1876, Miles suggested that the
Indians begin hauling freight from Wichita, Kansas to
Darlington. They would earn $1.50 for every 100 pounds, for
the 165 mile distance. The agent hoped the government would
provide the wagons and harnesses, thereby helping the
Indians earn income to apply to farming and other projects
on the reservation. The Cheyenne-Arapaho Transportation
Co. caught on slowly, but by 1880 it was the most popular
form of employment on the reservation. Although not very
profitable, freighting gave the Indians firsthand experience
49in an activity of a market economy.
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To direct the Cheyennes and Arapahoes away from their 
traditional communal lifestyle, Miles supported a plan to 
break up the larger camps into smaller villages, settling 
them along the fertile creek and river bottomlands. He 
hoped to obtain a White farmer to instruct each settlement 
in farming techniques. But, as Henry Fritz has pointed 
out,
Teaching Indians the value of individual industry was a 
complicated task. Because farmers, blacksmiths, and 
carpenters were paid out of annuity funds, Indians 
regarded them as servants rather than teachers. They 
were paid with the Indian's money, therefore it was 
their duty to perform the Indian's labor.50-
Although in theory farming embodied the American yeoman
ideal, Miles was aware that erratic rainfall on the southern
plains would not produce a steady livlihood for White or
Indian farmers. Results improved somewhat when adaptations
were made to plains conditions by plowing the fields early
in winter, letting the spring rains accumulate, and then
packing the soil down before the corn was seeded. To
supplement the meager farming output, Miles advocated that
the valley farms be joined to the larger sections of higher
51grazing land to link farming with ranching.
Cheyenne and Arapaho attitudes towards farming were 
very different. Arapaho chiefs encouraged their people to 
farm. They did quite well in 1878, considering issues of 
farm implements arrived late. They produced 9,6 00 bushels
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of corn, 360 bushels of potatoes and various other garden
vegetables. The Cheyenne men never were very enthusiastic
about farming; they considered it women's work. They
preferred freighting, making bricks for agency buildings,
or raising cattle. But again, their desire to work at these
5 2jobs far surpassed the agency's ability to pay them.
For the adult Indians , the kind of work they found 
around the agency was not what they were used to, and they 
adapted slowly, if at all, to its regular schedule. The 
meager spoils of an occasional buffalo hunt only highlighted 
the disappointment of agency life. From the agent's point 
of view, and that of the Peace Policy, the future lay in the 
education of the young.
Before the winter of 1875-1876, the only school on the 
reservation was a Quaker mission school. No Cheyennes, and 
a few more than fifty Arapahoes ever attended it. On 
January 1, 18 76, a new boarding school opened in Darlington, 
where the promise of regular rations attracted twenty 
Cheyenne and forty Arapaho boys and girls. By June, forty 
more pupils had enrolled, straining the school's capacity of 
100. The goal of the school, besides basic literacy, was to 
teach the vocational skills needed to achieve self- 
sufficiency.5^
John H. Seger was appointed supervisor of the Cheyenne- 
Arapaho Manual Training School. He, along with two of the
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older boys plowed, planted, and cared for the 110 acres 
devoted to the school's corn and vegetable crop. From the 
sale of the surplus from the first 2 years' crops, they 
started a school cattle herd of 171 cattle, and 40 swine.
The boys were paid half of the profits from the sale of 
vegetables and cattle. By the late summer of 1879, Miles 
estimated that the school herd had grown to about 973 head, 
worth $9,181.40.54
Miles was proud of what Seger had accomplished in such
a short time. He believed their herd to be the basis for a
program which, once increased to 15,000 head, would give
each student, upon graduation, 30 cattle with which to
start their own herd. But trouble began just when the
federal government observed the success of their programs.
The commissioner of Indian affairs ordered the herd divided
equally among the Indians. But 3 or 4 cattle per family
was of little consequence, unless they were added to the
herds some Arapahoes had alredy developed. The Cheyennes,
who had still not participated very much in agency life,
"usually sold, gambled off, or used the cattle as presents
55in place of ponies, or they killed them for a feast.
In the fall of 1879 there were two schools on the 
reservation; one at Darlington attended by the Arapahoes, 
and one a quarter mile north of the agency at Caddo Springs,
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attended by the Cheyennes. Between them 375 pupils, or 
about one quarter of the children on the reservation, went 
to these schools. Besides learning reading, writing, and 
arithmetic, the boys helped tend the school crops, learned 
to butcher and cut meat, bake bread, feed and water cattle 
and hogs, mend shoes and harnesses, milk cows, and cut and 
store hay for the animals. The girls learned to cook, sew, 
and wash. Also by 1880, 70 Cheyenne and Arapaho children 
were attending Carlisle Institute in Pennsylvania, a 
boarding school run by Captain Richard Pratt.
While school enrollment had shown a slow increase
during the latter half of the 1870s, 73 percent of the
Cheyenne and Arapaho children were still living in their
parents' camps, beyond the educational arm of the Peace
Policy. Only nine students found work at the agency; among
them Henry Roman Nose was a tinsmith, and Making Medicine
5 6preached the gospel in the Cheyenne language. At this 
pace the acculturation of the Indian would take much longer 
than the architects of the Peace Policy had expected.
During the three years Brinton Darlington administered 
the Cheyenne-Arapaho Agency these two tribes were still 
relying on the buffalo for their primary source of food, 
lodging, clothing, and trade goods. Some Arapahoes took up 
farming, but the Cheyennes had no intention of doing what
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they considered to be women's work. After the Red River War 
Agent John D. Miles did his best by helping his charges make 
their living and gain a basic education, geared to attain 
the skills needed to become an American citizen and a 
homesteader. Under the best conditions farming was marginal, 
so freighting supplies and ranching rose in importance.
During the first decade adaptations began which would point 
to the future survival of these tribes on the reservations. 
But the resistance of the Cheyennes to acculturation would 
continue to be a major source of conflict with goverment 
policy.
Santee and Yanktonais Sioux
In northeastern Dakota Territory, bands of Santee and
Yanktonais Sioux had been living their traditional nomadic-
hunting life throughout the late 1860s. But game had
become scarce and hunger was not uncommon. Although largely
uninvolved in the Sioux wars in Minnesota between 1862-1864,
the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Santee Sioux were driven
5 7west into the Dakotas in the aftermath. Early in 1867, 
in an effort to settle these peaceful Indians, some of their 
leaders came to Washington with Benjamin Thompson, brother 
of the Northern Superintendent, to negotiate a treaty. Two 
reservations were established in the treaty— one around 
Lake Traverse, in present-day South Dakota, and the other,
250 miles north, between the southern tip of Devils Lake and
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the Sheyenne River. Incorporated into this treaty were two
important elements of the Peace Policy. The first was the
allotment of the reservation into 160 acre tracts, with the
owner receiving inalienable patents, if after 5 years he had
50 acres under cultivation. The second element was that
rations would be distributed only in return for labor
performed, except for the elderly and the infirm. Also,
5 8to prohibit the chase, no trade in furs was permitted.
Benjamin Thompson was immediately appointed agent at 
Lake Traverse, but it would take 4 years before 500 Indians—  
the minimum required by the treaty for the appointment of 
an agent— were at Devils Lake. The Catholics were assigned 
to this new reservation, and Major William H. Forbes was 
appointed its first agent. Forbes, 55, was from Montreal.
He had begun working for Henry Sibley with the American Fur 
Co. in Mendota, Minnesota in 1837. He later ran a trading 
post on the old reservation in Minnesota, and became well
59acquainted with the Sioux people and learned their language.
Forbes chose as his assistant a 30 year old blacksmith, 
James McLaughlin, also a Canadian and a Catholic, had come 
to St. Paul in 1863. A year later he married a mixed-blood 
Mdewankanton Sioux woman, Marie Louise Buisson.^ After 
trying a number of different jobs, including traveling 
salesman, he applied and was accepted on the new agency, 
staff at Devils Lake. Because Forbes was not in good health,
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he was glad to have the younger man with him. Even though
the wages were low ($1,500 a year for Forbes; $720 a year
for McLaughlin), these positions had a relatively high 
61status.
Except for the Cuthead band of Yanktonais, who would
continue to roam as far west as the Milk River in Montana
Territory, these bands of Santees had been influenced by
American agents and missionaries since the 1820s. Major
Lawrence Taliaferro, agent to the Santee near Fort Snelling
from 1820-1839, promoted agriculture and supported
missionaries like Stephen Return Riggs, who translated parts
of the Bible into the Dakota language. Even at this time,
travelers to Minnesota who encountered the Sioux, commented
6 2on the absence of wild game in their area. Because they
could no longer rely on the chase, treaties could be made
which settled them on reservations and included provisions
for rations only in return for labor and the future allotment
of their lands. The Santees remained peaceful throughout the
1870s. Only a single attack on a stagecoach in 1877
disturbed an otherwise quiet decade of travel through their 
63country. Also, many Santee and Yanktonais chiefs had
come to accept the new regime and they became important
64allies of the agent in implementing the Peace Policy.
Since there were no new quarters for the agency, the 
first order of business was to fix up some old log buildings
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for Forbes' use at Fort Totten, located on the south shore
of Devils Lake. During the winter of 1871-1872, McLaughlin
directed the agency employees and the Indians in splitting
rails for fences, and squaring off enough logs to build
twenty houses. By the fall of 1872, he had set up a sawmill
and was building a considerable number of log houses
6 5complete with hand made furniture.
In 1871, under the direction of the mixed blood
farmer, George Faribault, the Indians produced a good
harvest of corn, turnips, and potatoes. They also put up
two hundred tons of hay, and had enough oxen to prepare for
the next spring's planting.
As Agent Miles had discovered on the Kiowa-Comanche
Reservation, Forbes found that he could save a great amount
of money and provide the Indians with a source of income by
freighting supplies. After the Northern Pacific Railroad
was built west to Jamestown in 1872., it was only an 85 mile
6 7haul with the ox teams from there to Devils Lake.
Forbes was not able to build a school and enlist nuns 
to teach until the fall of 1874. At that time 4 Sisters 
of the Grey Nuns of Montreal arrived to run the school for 
a salary of $150 a year each. They agreed to teach all the 
girls, and the boys up to age 12. The Indians helped build 
a school under McLaughlin's direction. It was located 
7 miles from the fort so as to be free from Army influence.
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A system of double rations was used to attract the young
6 8people and their parents to come to the new boarding school.
In the summer of 1873, Lieutenant Colonel L. C. Hunt,
at Fort Totten, observed that things were going pretty well
for the approximately 1,000 "peaceable" members of the
Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Sioux living near the post.
Some trouble had occurred earlier in the summer when a fire
was set in the timber where enlisted men were chopping wood
for the fort. In addition, the hay contractor, who was also
the post trader, was shot as he returned to the post. Hunt
did not think Indians from Devils Lake were responsible, but
he did suspect the Chippewas from Turtle Mountain, ninety
miles to the north.
Agent Forbes told Colonel Hunt that the Devils Lake
Indians had "about 125 old shot guns, mostly flint locks and
single barrels" for which "small quantities of
ammunition are issued for hunting purposes." A recent
arrival of 30 yoke of oxen had added to "this encouragement
to labor," but for all this to have its fullest effect, Hunt
felt that eventually the agency would have to move its
69facilities closer to the school and fields.
Hunt also saw a problem with the Cuthead band of 
Yanktonais, who roamed back and forth between the Grand 
River Agency, to the west, and Devils Lake. The issue was 
still not settled in March 1875, when he requested cavalry
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companies to remain at Fort Totten to keep the peace when the
Cutheads came to visit. They show "marks of great discontent,
on account of the non-recognition of their claims to a share
70of the Sisseton and Wahpeton annuities."
In January 1875, the ailing Forbes, well aware of the
crucial part McLaughlin played in the smooth running of the
agency, wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Edward
P. Smith, in an effort to.raise his assistant's salary. The
raise was granted, and henceforth McLaughlin would be paid
$1,200 a year. But on July 20 William Forbes died. To
everyone's surprise, the Catholic Board nominated Paul
Beckwith, a young Indiana politician, to become Forbes*
successor. It seems that with the sudden death of Forbes,
General Charles Ewing, the Catholic Commissioner, in his
haste to make a replacement, missed the many recommendations
for the McLaughlin appointment. Undaunted, McLaughlin
managed to straighten things out over the next year, and
71replaced Beckwith on July 3, 1876.
Writing his memoirs in 1905, McLaughlin recalled his
goal as Indian agent:
To the men of my time was appointed the task of taking 
the raw and bleeding material which made the hostile 
strength of the plains Indians, of bringing that 
material to the mills of the white man, and of 
transmuting it into a manufactured product that might 
be absorbed by the nation without interfering with the 
national digestion.72
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Whether this mechanistic scenario of human transformation
was in his mind at the start of his fifty-two years in the
Indian Service (1871-1923), McLaughlin's tenure at Devils
Lake, and later at Standing Rock, were widely praised. By
the time he left Devils Lake in 1881, the Sioux had agreed
73to settle on individual allotments.
Some aspects of Eastern Sioux culture which persisted 
into the first few years of reservation life demanded the 
agent's attention if detribalization, as required by the 
Peace Policy, was to be carried out. Whereas the Quaker 
agents were still struggling to break the power of the 
chiefs during the distribution of weekly rations, by 1879 
at Devils Lake the heads of families received their rations 
once a month. Opportunities to earn supplies were available 
working at odd jobs around the agency, on the farms, and by 
hauling goods from Jamestown. The Indians were paid with 
"checks" which were good at the agency storeroom. By being 
consistent in not allowing rations unless earned through 
individual labor, Agents Forbes and McLaughlin taught their 
charges the work ethic and an appreciation for private
4. 7 4property.
Another custom they wanted to curb was the Indians' 
desire to visit their friends and relatives at other 
reservations, while occasionally stealing horses along the 
way. A month after the Battle of the Little Big Horn the
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agent from Standing Rock, Dakota Territory, wrote Mclaughlin:
"I have the honor to inform you that some of the Indians of
the Reservation [sic] are now visiting your agency. At this
time it is proper for them to be at home." He applied for,
and received permission from J. Q. Smith, the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, to obtain extra flour and beef to
encourage his people to come back, although the rest of his
supplies were depleted. He then added: "Everything is
75quiet here, but many sensational rumors." The next day,
July 28, 1876, McLaughlin wrote Commissioner Smith to dispel
suspicions that any Indians from Devils Lake had joined the
Hunkpapa Chief Sitting Bull. His Indians feared them as
much as the Whites did, he said. The reason why some of
the Indians from Devils Lake were off the reservation was
because the recent departure of the previous agent, Paul
Beckwith, had left the agency supplies critically low. They
had to travel south to the Sisseton Agency to seek assistance
from relatives, or hunt game and dig wild turnips. ". . . a s
soon as I received supplies," said McLaughlin, " . . .  small
as they were I sent out for them to return and they
7 6willingly and cheerfully obeyed."
If an Indian wanted to visit another agency, he was 
required to obtain a pass from his agent. Sometimes the 
agent wrote ahead, as did C. A. Rufee of the White Earth 
Agency, when he let McLaughlin know that he had issued a
38
pass to a chief to come to Devils Lake. In recommending
him, Rufee wrote, "He cultivates the soil and is 
77industrious." The acting Sisseton agent, H. H. Hart told 
McLaughlin, "I shall give few passes this year." One of them 
was given to a former scout at Fort Totten, who wanted a pass 
to "visit your Reservation [sic] and bring back his 
children."
Apparently, McLaughlin was considered quite hospitable. 
Standing Rock agent W. T. Darling, sent him a list of 164 
people from his reservation who, he was told by "some of our 
most reliable Indians . . . . were being subsidized
by you." Complained Hughes, "The habit of Indians roving 
about from one agency to another has become a source of
79great annoyance to the agents and it should be broken u p ."
Fort Berthold agent, C. W. Darling, expressed similar
chagrin to McLaughlin,
. . . any Indians who may come here from your agency 
without a proper pass from you will get anything but a 
pleasant reception from me & I hope you will refuse to 
give any of this agency any thing [sic] to eat but at 
once order them back where they belong. such [sic] 
visits are made with no other purpose but for begging 
in which they are quite accomplished.
Also, many letters were sent between agents, and 
between White settlers and agents, circulating rumors and 
accusations of horse stealing. Few of the rustlers were 
caught, and as often as not the thieves were White men.
Just that occurred in the spring of 1878, when 23 horses
39
were stolen from Fort Berthold, 145 miles west of Devils
Lake. At first the Berthold agent, E. H. Alden, insinuated
that some of these horses were at Devils Lake. Some Indians
from Fort Berthold even came over and retaliated by stealing
8 horses from Devils Lake. If the original charge was true,
it would have broken a peace treaty made between these two
81tribes1 in 1870.
In order to investigate the matter, McLaughlin and
his charges sent their own peace commission to visit the
Berthold Indians during the last two weeks of July 1878.
In their council, once they had determined that two White
men were headed up towards Canada with their stolen stock,
the Berthold people
. . . did everything possible to make the visit a 
pleasant one and gave a number of ponies to the Devils 
Lake Indians in return for the ones taken, also added 
a number as a fine for having broken the treaty of 
Peace made between them in 18 70. A new agreement was 
drawn up and signed by the representative men of both 
Agencies.
In August, McLaughlin was subpoenaed as a witness to the 
U.S. District Court in Fargo, D. T . , where one of the two
White men had been captured, along with five of the stolen
, 82 horses.
The effort to strip the Indian of his identity 
continued on the reservation with an effort by McLaughlin 
to change the traditional way the Sioux wore their hair. 
McLaughlin wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
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E. A Hayt, that in February 1878, "I had the honor to 
maintain the steps taken to induce the Indians of this 
reservation to cut off their hair, the result has been most 
gratifying, nearly 200 adult-male Indians (a majority of 
all) have now cut their hair and are not ashamed of having
done so, this is quite a sacrafice [sic] for an
t »83Indian, . . . "
Besides the way the Indians looked, the persistent
power of the Sioux spiritual leaders remained an annoyance
for McLaughlin. Those chiefs and medicine men who refused
to conform to his policies were seen by McLaughlin and other
agents as being responsible for blocking progress on the
reservation. He urged the commissioner of Indian affairs
to back him in deposing them from power. A mixed blood
Sioux named Tiawashta [spelling unclear] was, according to
McLaughlin, "selfish and unprincipled, he is a strong
medicine man, greatly attached to all Indian ways, and is
84very much opposed to schools and Missionary teachers. "
These men led the "medicine dances," which Mclaughlin
banned from the reservation. "Before leaving Devils Lake,"
he said, "I put a stop to a sundance, and believe that it
8 5has never been practiced there since." The Presbyterian 
missionary, John P. Williamson, applauded McLaughlin's 
efforts:
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That medicine dance is the greatest curse to all the 
Minnesota Sioux, and has blocked many an effort to 
teach them Christianity. I fear it is not dead yet 
for I believe it has as many lives as a cat. But I am
very glad you have taken the thing in hand and hope you
will not become weary or become discouraged in well 
doing, and that the Lord will prosper all your efforts 
to change the wild nature of these p e o p l e . ° 6
McLaughlin initiated other parts of the Peace Policy
during his five years as agent at Devils Lake. His monthly
reports reflect confidence in an expanding farming program.
As the extreme cold of winter began to subside in March 1878,
the agency farmer, George Faribault, began to visit the
Indian camps to pay the people for previous work, and to
8 7plan for spring planting and other necessary chores.
Although still getting some snow in April, "the Indians of
the reservation have never shown such a spirit of
contentedness, nor such a determination to increase their 
88fields. . . . "  And by the end of May McLaughlin was
boasting of the Indians' willingness "to overcome any
obstacle to place themselves beyond want next winter by
8 9planting larger fields than in former years."
As a greater number of the Devils Lake Sioux were 
willing to try farming and live in log houses, McLaughlin 
became increasingly concerned that the little timbered land 
there was should be surveyed and alloted according to the 
treaty of 1867. "There is no other question," he said, "so 
annoying to the Agent here as this one of disputed timber
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claims, it also causes much dissatisfaction and many petty
quarrels among the Indians, which can only be remedied by
90the survey and proper allotments." He hoped to achieve an
equal distribution by dividing three townships into forty 
91acre tracts. As an individual improved his land, the 
agent provided him with new farm equipment as a reward.
Wheat production, begun in 1878, increased so much in two 
years that they were able to build their own flour mill at
4 . V ,  ' 9 2the agency.
The Indians also made money by cutting wood for’the 
school, the agency, and the fort. In a contract for hauling 
wood to Fort Totten from September 18, 1877 to April 29,
931878, 35 wood carriers hauled 251 cords, earning $697.78.
Their biggest money maker was freighting supplies from
Jamestown, 85 miles to the south. The rate was usually about
$.70 per 100 pounds. In December 1878, the Sioux took 9 of
the best ox teams to Jamestown to get medical supplies,
bedsteads, and lumber. It took them 14 days, and
"everything was brought through in good shape by the 
94Indians."
At Devils Lake, the double ration system developed by
Agent Forbes helped fill the school to capacity. But by
1877, both McLaughlin and the Indian commissioner agreed
that although the agency school should remain a boarding
95school, double rations were no longer affordable.
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Initially McLaughlin felt that extra rations were needed
because the school farm was not producing enough food. But
by 1878, the children had a 6 acre garden with 2k acres of
potatoes (yielding 40 bushels), 2 acres of corn, and lk acres
of onions, beets, carrots, squash, pumpkins, cucumbers,
tomatoes, cabbage, peas, and beans. The agent also
recommended the school be allowed to purchase more cows,
15-20 sheep, and a wooden loom, so "One of the Sisters can
96teach carding, spinning, & weaving."
In 1878, McLaughlin was granted permission to build an
addition to the school, with a wing for a hosptial (one of
the Grey Nuns had already been serving as a physician). To
serve the older boys, who had not been receiving instruction
at the agency school (St. Michael's), a log cabin was built,
where the Benedictine Fathers and Brothers would teach them
9 7vocational and manual arts.
Throughout the 1870s, White settlers established 
themselves in the area around the Devils Lake Reservation. 
With a minimum of 3,000 acres each, 91 bonanza farms
9 8developed successful wheat production in this arid land.
A resurvey of the western boundary of the reservation in 
1883, discovered that the true line was 64,000 acres 
westward. Since Whites were already established in that 
area, Congress decided to compensate the Indians at $1.25 an 
acre. The $80,000 which they finally received in 1891, was
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used to buy stock and farm machinery to support agriculture
9 9on the reservation. By 1883, James J. Hill's St. Paul,
Minneapolis and Manitoba Railroad had reached the northeast 
corner of the reservation, thus eliminating the Indians'
freighting opportunities, which had been a crucial source
* . . 100 of income to many.
Other pressures from encroaching White settlers were
being experienced by the Pembina and Turtle Mountain
Chippewas, just ninety miles to the north of Devils Lake.
Members of these bands came to express their concerns to
McLaughlin about the great loss of game in their area and
the Canadians hauling away some of their best timber.
McLaughlin saw that among the White settlers:
. . . there is a growing desire to have the Indian 
title extinguished and the country opened for settlement. 
The country claimed by these Indians is among the best 
in Dakota, being both well watered and timbered, and 
the rush of immigration coming into this great wheat 
growing region, is such that another year will 
undoubtedly see the greater portion of their country 
over-run by whites.lul
McLaughlin's observations were to prove accurate for
many reservations during the 1880s and beyond. Western
pressures to open Indian land to White settlement influenced
the passage of the General Allotment Act in 1887. This made
individual land allotment and the responsibilities of
American citizenship mandatory for Indians, whether they
were ready for them or not. These were not new ideas, but
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ones which had appeared in treaties from 1854 onward and
were clearly stated as goals for the Peace Policy by the
10 2Board of Indian Commissioners in 1869.
During the 1880s Norwegian and German-Russian 
immigrants farmed and built towns bordering the Devils Lake 
Reservation. Agents Forbes and McLaughlin worked hard to 
prepare their charges for the kind of America they would 
have to compete in once the terms of their treaty expired. 
The Santee Sioux had eagerly signed their treaty with the 
United States in 1867. Fourteen years later, when 
McLaughlin left to become agent at Standing Rock, the Devils 
Lake Indians had been assigned individual allotments of 
land; he had established the structure for them to stand or 
fall as yeoman farmers.
Along with land allotment, McLaughlin carried out a 
persistent attack on Santee and Yanktonais communal tribal 
culture. He stopped them from stealing horses and leaving 
the reservation for visits among their relatives without 
first receiving his permission. He made them cut their 
hair and wear the shirts, pants, and dresses ("citizens' 
dress") worn by most non-Indian men and women on the 
frontier. And perhaps most important, the agent would not 
tolerate the Indians' desire to integrate Christianity 
within their traditional religious practices. What 
McLaughlin considered heathen had to be stopped.
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Thus, through the authority of the agents and the 
nearby presence of the United States Army, the government's 
program of civilization for the Indian was promulgated 
throughout the 1870s. Each tribe came to terms with the 
reality in its own way. The Arapahoes and the Santee Sioux 
appeared ready to experiment with the farming life, whereas 
the Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, and Yanktonais Sioux all 
chose to fight the imposition of a foreign culture. This 
chapter has been concerned primarily with the general 
responses of these five tribes to the agents' efforts to 
implement Grant's Peace Policy. Chapter two will follow 
each tribe into the 1880s and examine the wide range of 
adaptations individual Indians made to the reservation 
milieu.
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CHAPTER 2
THESE ARE NEARLY ALL "BLANKET INDIANS"
The struggles on the reservations during the 187 0s 
centered around the Indian agents establishing control by 
breaking the influence of the traditional leaders, and by 
convincing the Indians to send their children to school and 
to begin farming and ranching like the White man. This 
chapter will discuss the political, economic, and religious 
institutions through which some Indians came to terms with 
reservation life, and still maintained their Indian identity. 
The agent allocated political power to the Indians by 
appointing those most amenable to his program to positions 
on the Indian police force and the Court of Indian Offenses. 
Ranching and the leasing of rangeland to cattlemen in 
western Indian Territory and wheat farming in the Dakotas 
were the dominant economic activities through which 
individuals or groups of Indians could become economically 
self-sufficient. The Ghost Dance and peyote ceremonialism 
represented the religious responses the Indians made to 
establish new forms of spiritual renewal in the face of the 
government's attack on their old observances.
Among the Kiowas and Comanches of western Indian 
Territory and the Devils Lake Sioux of Dakota Territory, the
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Indian police and Court of Indian Offenses functioned 
according to the government's plan. The police kept 
intruders off the reservations, carried out the orders of
the agent, kept the peace, and arrested law breakers. The
Court of Indian Offenses tried those whom the police 
arrested and imposed appropriate sentences. These 
institutions had less success on the Cheyenne-Arapaho 
Reservation where the Cheyenne Dog Soldiers, a traditional 
warrior society, retained their power throughout the decade 
resulting in little cooperation with government policymaker 
The most viable economic institution in western 
Indian Territory, considering the small Congressional 
appropriations for beef and the Indians1 general lack of 
success in farming and ranching at this time, was the 
leasing of reservation rangeland to Texas cattlemen. The 
■Kiowas and Comanches, although split into factions over the 
issue, did benefit economically from leasing during the 
1880s and 1890s. The open hostilities between the Dog 
Soldiers and their agent prevented leasing or other 
j government supported alternatives from developing on the 
Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation. The Sioux of Devils Lake 
and their agent benefitted from the boom in bonanza wheat 
farming and high prices of the early 1880s. They sold 
their surplus wheat to several local markets, bought modern
56
farm machinery, and expanded their agricultural output 
throughout the decade.
Indian religious innovation was a prominent feature of 
reservation life at this time. Here we see the distinct 
personalities of the tribes, as they responded to the 
various religious movements in their own ways. The 
Comanches adopted the peyote rituals and the Kiowas 
produced several messianic movements, including the peaceful 
Ghost Dance of 1890-1891. The Arapahoes participated in the 
peyote rites and the Ghost Dance, while the Cheyennes did 
not commit themselves to either as a tribe, but participated 
individually in both. Catholicism was dominant among the 
Sioux of Devils Lake, where public performance of their 
native ceremonies was prohibited. However, with a change of 
agents in the 1890s, resulting in less control on the 
reservation, traditional religious practices surfaced again.
Kiowas and Comanches
Kiowa and Comanche leaders emerged out of all three of 
these newly developed institutions. Although grossly 
underpaid, the Indian police formed a cadre committed to 
carrying out the orders of the agent. They attempted to 
keep the peace among the Indians, escorted intruders off the 
reservation, and worked as laborers on the upkeep of the 
agency. The Court of Indian Offenses was also active,
57
fulfilling its mandate to promote the values of the 
individualized White society through its judgments. The 
agent had to approve all of the court's rulings and 
sometimes allowed the judges to decide questions based on 
traditional tribal principals of justice. In economics, 
important ralationships developed between Texas cattlemen, 
agents, and Comanche leaders especially. Quanah Parker, a 
Quahada Comanche chief, emerged as a pivotal personality on 
all fronts throughout this period. Three times during the 
1880s, messianic visions inspired the Kiowas to dance and 
sing for the return of the buffalo and for the disappearance 
of the Whites. The Comanches found spiritual solace in the 
rituals surrounding the ingestion of peyote.
In the early reservation years, Congress had not 
provided for any kind of local police force for either the 
maintenance of order, or for the supervision of the 
government's program for civilizing the Indian. A few 
agents had already established forces of their own,1 but it 
was taking Congress a long time, as usual, to recognize the 
need and to appropriate funds for Indian policemen. The 
most recent law applying to Indian affairs in general was 
the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, which gave the agent 
the authority to remove trouble makers from the reservation. 
By 1878, the commissioners of Indian affairs had received 
sufficient testimony— including a letter from Kiowa-Comanche
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Agent J. M. Haworth, concerning horse thieves and whiskey
peddlers on their reservations— to persuade Congress to
authorize Indian police forces in May 1878. An
appropriation of $30,000 allocated $8 per month for
officers, and $5 for privates. Within six months, one third
of the agencies in the country had police, and by 1890 they
2were installed at all of them.
This was one of the first institutions under the
federal government's assimilation program that allowed the 
Indians some control over their own lives and recognized the 
prior existence of indigenous systems of social control
3within the different Indian societies. At the same time,
the reservation police served to disrupt traditional Indian
institutions by aggressively carrying out the orders of the
Indian agent. Agents sought out the progressives over the
traditionalists: those mostly younger Indians who were
willing to try the White man's road as opposed to those who
clung to their identities as Indians. A testament about the
usefulness of the police to the civilization process was
made by the acting commissioner of Indian affairs in 1880:
. . . in general, at all agencies Indian policemen act 
as guards at annuity payments; render assistance and 
preserve order during ration issues; protect agency 
buildings and property; return truant pupils to school; 
search for and return lost or stolen property, whether 
belonging to Indians or white men; prevent depredations 
on timber, and the introduction of whiskey on the 
reservation; bring whiskey sellers to trial; make 
arrests for disorderly conduct, drunkenness, wife-
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beating, theft, and other offenses; serve as couriers 
and messengers; keep the agent informed as to births 
and deaths in the tribe, and notify him promptly as to 
the coming on the reserve of any strangers, white or 
Indian. Vigilant and observant by nature, and familiar 
with every foot-path on the reservation, no arrivals or 
departures, or clandestine councils can escape their 
notice, and with a well disciplined police-force an 
agent can keep himself informed as to every noteworthy 
occurrence taking place within the entire limit of his 
jurisdiction.
Not only would the police protect and spy on their fellow
tribesmen, but they would also serve as a model for the
transition from Indian to White man:
The lessons of self-control, of respect for the rights 
of others in person and property, of the maintenance of 
social order by law administered by the community 
instead of revenge obtained by the individual, when once 
learned, mark an important advance in the scale of 
civilization, and rudimentary lessons of this sort are 
daily taught by the Indian police system, which calls 
upon one Indian to arrest and pronounce deliberate 
judgement upon another for offenses, many of which 
hitherto have not only gone unpunished, but have been 
unrecognized as meriting punishment.4
On the Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Reservation, the 
new agent, P. B. Hunt— a Kentuckian and former lieutenant 
colonel in the Union Army— had to contend with resentment 
created by the recent killing of two Comanches by soldiers 
before he could enlist a group of trustworthy policemen. 
However, the tenure of the Quakers had ended at this agency 
with the departure of Agent James M. Haworth, and Hunt 
would be less concerned with appeasement than were his two 
peaceful predecessors. The goals of the Peace Policy were 
still in effect despite the retirement of the Quakers from
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directing the Central Superintendency. Its further
implementation would be accomplished by men with much more
practical sensibilities. In this case, Hunt chose to
recruit his policemen by refusing to allow the Indians to go
out on their annual buffalo hunt until the ranks of the
police were filled. By November 1879, two officers and
twenty-six privates formed the first force of Indian police
5at that agency. Thxs was a tactic that helped Hunt 
establish control early in his term as agent.
Until this time, Indians arrested by the Indian police
were either tried by the agent, or taken to a federal court
in Texas or Arkansas, where fair trials for Indians were
rare. However, it was not to lighten the trial load of the
agent or to achieve justice for Indians accused of crimes
that the Court of Indian Offenses was established. It was,
according to Commissioner J. D. C. Atkins,
. . . to destroy the tribal relations as fast as
possible, by abolishing the old heathenish customs 
that have been for many years resorted to, by the 
worst elements on the reservation, to retard the 
progress and advancement of the Indians to a higher 
standard of civilization and education.®
In traditional Comanche society, justice was obtained 
not in a court or council, but on a one-to-one basis, where 
each party understood the acceptable sanctions for each 
offense. Typical crimes were adultery, wife stealing and
seduction. According to Wallace and Hoebel, "the aggrieved
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and his personal supporters had to push the process to its
conclusion, or nothing would be done at all to provide
7relief or redress."
The structure of the new reservation courts was
outlined by Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Thomas J. Morgan:
Each court consists of three judges who are appointed 
by the Indian police, upon the nomination of the 
respective Indian agents, for a term of one year, but 
are subject to removal at any time. The court holds 
regular sessions twice a month. The crimes and offenses 
named in the rules are Indian dances, plural marriages, 
practices of medicine men, theft, destruction of 
property belonging to another, payments or offers of 
payment for living or cohabitating with Indian women, 
drunkenness and the introduction, sale, gift, or barter 
of intoxicating liquors.8
Although these rules were first published in 1883, 
under Secretary Henry M. Teller and Commissioner Hiram 
Price, most reservations did not have Courts of Indian 
Offenses until 1886. Even then, since no compensation was 
provided, the judges had to be chosen from the ranks of the 
Indian police, which presented conflicts of interest.
Congress finally made appropriations for the judges' 
salaries in 1888, of from $3 to $8 per month. These rose 
to a yearly average of $7 per month by 1904.
Like the Indian police, the Court of Indian Offenses 
offered the opportunity for Indians to attain status and 
power on the reservation when the agent awarded judgeships 
to those men who appeared most willing to commit themselves 
to his civilization program. In making these important
appointments, the agent had to be sensitive to the Indian's
own power structure and to the criteria of officals in
9Washington. This was not an easy task.
The first Court of Indian Offenses on the Kiowa,
Comanche, and Wichita Reservation, appointed by Agent
Captain J. Lee Hall in 1886, contained all Comanches,
including Quanah Parker. Hall's court dissolved two years
later after he was dismissed for drunkenness and dishonesty
No doubt the other tribes on the reservation were not very
happy with such an unrepresentative court anyway.1 1̂
In 1888 the new agent, E. E. White, appointed another
Court of Indian Offenses with a broader representation. He
chose Quanah of the Comanches, Lone Wolf of the Kiowas, and
Jim Tehnacana of the Wichitas. White felt that the
friendlier atmosphere of their own reservation, where moral
support and bail money would be more accessible, would
somehow reduce the number of crimes.^'*' The judges were not
paid at first, but eventually the commissioner set their
salary at $10 a month. Lone Wolf presided over only one
decision of the court— one in which an Indian was fined $24
for drunkenness. He was replaced by his brother, an Indian
12policeman named Chaddle-kaung-ky.
For the next thirteen years, the Indians at the 
Anadarko agency would have some opportunities to implement 
their ideas of justice through the Court of Indian Offenses
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For example, the head of the Indian police, Eagle Tail
Feather, remembered how Quanah decided a dispute between two
Comanche men who both claimed the same piece of land. The
land was awarded to the one who was determined, by testimony,
to have been the braver warrior, not to the one who had
13claimed the land first. An Indian found guilty of killing
a friend with an "unloaded" gun was given ten days in jail;
and the plaintiff in a bigamy case was awarded $10 and a
14"well-broken pony." On the other hand, the judges had to 
support the agent's effort to eliminate Sun Dances, Scalp 
Dances, medicine-making, and polygamy. Surely, it seemed to 
them that their whole culture was on trial.
Throughout Quanah's career as a judge (1885-1898), he 
was embroiled in controversy over his refusal to stop being 
a polygamist. Most Indian men who were married before the 
reservation began had more than one wife. Nevertheless, the 
complaints of Quanah's enemies (those who opposed his 
pro-leasing stance, for instance) reached Commissioners 
Morgan and Jones. They said they would remove the 
progressive chief from the Court of Indian Offenses if he 
would not give up four of his five wives. Quanah told the 
government officials to come down and choose for him which 
of his wives he had to let go. They knew better than to 
attempt that. Meanwhile, Agents Adams and Baldwin defended 
Quanah and the other progessives by urging the commissioners
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to accept polygamy as a practice from the old days which 
should be left to die naturally in the new environment, as 
indeed, from their point of view, the traditional Indian 
himself was doing.
Besides, the progressive Indians were supporting the
government's policies on the reservations. The agent
commended the effort the Indians were making
. . . through their council which drew up three new laws
on marital relations. They provided for punishment 
of women deserting their husbands, and of husbands taking 
up with new women, with or without abandoning the first 
wife.15
Despite the agent's approval, the commissioner eventually 
removed Quanah and Apiatan from the Court of Indian Offenses 
after being influenced more by the enemies of the two chiefs. 
The court dissolved for the Kiowas, Comanches, and Wichitas 
when the government alloted the reservation in 1901.
fA constant economic problem throughout these years was
a shortage of food.^ Until the late 1870s, the Kiowas and
Comanches were able to supplement their meager rations with
annual buffalo hunts. By 1879-1880, the great southern
herds had been destroyed by commercial hide hunters, and the
Indians were thereafter tied to the agency for subsistence.
After two years of severe drought, Agent Hunt concluded,
Nothing is more certain than that this country is badly
adapted to agriculture, the scarcity of rainfall cutting
short the crops one and sometimes two out of three 1 7years. '
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He felt that rations should have been increased after the 
buffalo were gone, for he really had little hope that 
ranching would succeed there either. During the previous 
year, Hunt had issued 600 head of cattle to those Indians 
most likely to build up their own herds. But rations were 
only lasting four days out of a week, and the Kiowas and 
Comanches were forced to butcher their own breeding cattle. 
Hunt said,
It will be very difficult to prevent this altogether, so 
long as the present state of things exists. It is well 
known that the ration issued to the Indians is 
insufficient, that it does not by any means satisfy 
their appetite.
Meanwhile, a boom market had developed in Texas cattle.
Range stock which sold for $7 or $8 a head in 1878, would
reach $30 to $35 by 1882.^  On the way north to Abilene or
to Dodge City, Kansas, cowboys let their herds drift onto
the Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Reservation to feed on the
rich grasses, that had so recently sustained the buffalo and
the Indian. The poorly equipped Indian police, accompanied
by a military escort, were kept busy locating and disarming
20trespassers, and moving them off the reservation. Once
this was accomplished, wrote historian Martha Buntin,
Both the police and military detail were required, by 
their instructions, to return the arms at the border, 
count the cattle, list the number under each brand, and 
report fully to Agent Hunt.21
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Even when the agent collected the legal fee of a dollar per 
head, the ranchers considered trespassing on the reservation 
worth while. By 1881, amidst this confusion, opportunities 
emerged for individual Indians to profit and to influence 
reservation politics for the next twenty years.
The agency headquarters was moved north from Fort Sill
to the Wichita Agency at Anadarko in 1878. The consolidated
three tribes now cost the government $10,000 a year to
administer, instead of $18,000. The military was not very
happy about the move, because it made their job of
protecting agency personnel more difficult. The army
supported the Comanches who preferred to remain in territory
22familiar to them in the southern part of the reservation.
The Comanches had been and remained the most obstinant 
settlers on the reservation since they were led into Fort 
Sill by the defiant young Quanah in 1875. Now that they had 
an eighty mile roundtrip to obtain their weekly rations at 
Anadarko, it seemed less likely that they would settle down 
as farmers any time in the near future.
As the winter of 1881-1882 came to an end, Agent Hunt 
was faced with a 25 percent cut in the beef ration for his 
agency. The previous summer alarm spread among agency 
personnel when the Kiowas refused to accept the meager beef 
ration, complaining that it was too small to subsist on. 
Also, drought and overstocking of the open range in Texas
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made cattlemen especially eager to use the reservation 
23grass. Since the Indians were hungry, and it seemed 
impossible to keep the cattlemen off the reservation, Hunt 
allowed the cattle to remain until July 1, in return for 340 
head. But before the cattle were delivered, Congress made 
an emergency appropriation, restoring the beef ration to 
the higher level of 1881. ’A persistent effort by Hunt 
resulted in the commissioner allowing him to distribute the 
340 head from the ranchers as cows for breeding purposes.
This transaction established the White ranchers as part of 
the reservation-milieu.^
Since the Comanches were the first tribe to encounter 
the cattlemen grazing their herds along the Red River, it is 
instructive to examine their reactions to this new intrusion 
on their lands. At first all the Indians were opposed to 
letting Whites occupy large sections of their continually 
shirnking domain. But as the tribe faced the reality of 
survival within the confines of the reservation, with its 
chronic shortages of food and other necessities, splits 
occurred within the Comanche leadership, which the cattlemen 
and agents were quick to exploit. Since hunting and war no 
longer comprised the central activities through’ which 
leadership was attained, new ways had to be found under the 
new conditions. In order for the ranchers to protect their 
interests, they made payoffs to a variety of Comanche headmen.
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Among the first Comanches to gain influence with the
cattlemen was the religious leader Eschiti, who in 1874 had
a vision which inspired the attack on the White buffalo
hunters at Adobe Walls. Another Comanche on the ranchers'
payroll was Parmansu, or Comanche Jack, an Indian policeman.
A third, and possibly the most influential Comanche over the
next thirty years was Quanah, who in 1875 surpassed Eschiti
as leader of the Quahada band (one of about twelve Comanche
bands), and lead them in to surrender at Fort Sill. The
cattlemen paid Quanah $50 a month for his services, and $25
25for the others.
Born about 1852, Quanah was the son of the Comanche 
war chief Peta Nocona, and the White captive Cynthia Anne 
Parker. While his White heritage may have caused him 
hardship early in life, he survived and became an influencial 
young warrior. Under the new conditions of the reservation, 
where government officials viewed the tribe as a unified 
entity, Quanah drew favorable attention when they learned 
his mother had been a White captive. Colonel Ranald S. 
Mackenzie, who brought the Comanches into Fort Sill, made 
an effort to link Quanah up with his mother, only to find 
out she had died. At that time, with the terror of Comanche 
raids into Texas so fresh in their minds, none of Quanah's 
other White relatives were willing to meet with him. Only 
years later, after newspaper reporters had made him a
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celebrity, did they step forward and claim him as their own.
Early in his term as agent, P. B. Hunt tried to help Quanah
claim a piece of land his mother had been given in
compensation for her years as a captive of the Comanches.
This effort failed, but it was indicative of the Whites'
attraction to the rising Quahada leader.
Hunt also had great influence in maintaining Quanah as
the head of his ninety-three member band. Band leader was
a key position of authority, since rations and annuities
were obtained through the band chief. If the agent opposed
the influence of a particular band chief, he would encourage
a more cooperative leader to split off with his followers
and form a new band, thereby diminishing the power of the
former band leader. This resulted in the creation of an
additional twenty bands in the five years they had been on
2 6the reservation. In this way Quanah was able to surpass
other potential leaders such as Mowaway, chief of the
Cochethkas; Toshaway and Esahabbe, of the Penetethkas;
Howeah and Iron Mountain, of the Yamparekas; or Horse Back,
a Noconie. These men were all, wrote William T. Hagan, "of
sufficient stature to be signatories in 1867 of the treaty
of Medicine Lodge Creek, which provided the legal framework
27for their reservation life." Quanah, who was also there,
2 8did not sign the treaty.
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Of course these new dealings between Indians, like 
Quanah, and cattlemen were contrary to what was supposed to 
be taking place on the reservation as envisioned by eastern 
reformers and politicians. They were well aware that the 
Indians were not farming successfully and only a few had 
built up their own cattle herds, yet there was money to be 
made in leasing. In addition, an intense lobbying effort 
was being made by Indians and cattlemen in 1884-1885.
Quanah and Parmansu, along with the Kiowas Big Bov;, Howling
e
Wolf, and Tohauson, went to Washington in August 1884, and
the two Comanches went again in February 1885, accompanied
by ranchers E. C. Sugg and George W. Fox. Out of the latter
meeting with Interior Secretary Lucius Q. Lamar, came the
decision not to interfere with the cattlemens' proposed
6-year lease of 1.5 million acres, including an annual rent
of 6 cents an acre, and a promise to employ 54 Indian herders
29at $20 to $35 a month.
Most of the Kiowas were opposed to the leasing 
agreement because the cattlemen were not as interested in 
their lands, situated in the northern part of the 
reservation. Not all the Comanches were behind the plan 
either. About a third of them, led by Tabananaka and White 
Wolf, felt the pro-leasing leaders had sold out to the 
cattlemen, and wanted them demoted from their positions as 
chiefs. They refused to accept their $9 per capita of the
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second "grass payment" (about $7,300 of $27,306), issued in 
30January 1886. This money was put on deposit for them in 
the U.S. Treasury, while the money accepted by the pro­
leasing group quickly found its way into the coffers of the 
reservation traders. A more constructive use of these 
funds, thought Agent J. Lee Hall, would have been to build 
up the Indians' cattle herds. Unfortunately, Hall was 
dismissed from his duties in October 1887, after being 
charged with embezzling $14,008. His successor, Special 
Agent E. E. White, a vocal critic of Hall, leased 
reservation land himself, and then sublet it to the 
cattlemen for his share of the Comanche grass money. It 
appears that some agents viewed their jobs in the Indian 
Service as opportunities to get rich.^1
r
The organized efforts of the cattlemen and Indians on 
the Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Reservation during the 
1880s had so great an impact that they probably contributed 
to the delay in the opening of the reservation until the 
turn of the century (see Chapter 3). In February 1891, 
Congress passed a law which would allow grazing leases for 
periods of up to five years. Also, the anti-leasing faction 
among the Kiowas dissolved when it was learned that $50,000 
worth of deposits had accumulated in the U.S. Treasury for 
those who had refused grass payments over the last five
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years. Soon Lone Wolf was representing the Kiowas on
32delegations to Washington for the negotiation of new leases.
Quanah Parker continued to lead the pro-leasing
faction. According to Hagan:
Presumably the cattlemen saw Quanah as their most able 
Indian advocate of leasing, and he seemed happy to play 
the role. The Texans got an articulate Comanche ally 
and expressed their gratitude in financial terms to a 
young Indian trying to live like a white m a n . 33
In addition to his trips to Washington, the cattlemen sent
Quanah to Fort Worth and Dallas, where eager newspaper
reporters talked to the Comanche chief and made the most of
his warrior past and his bright entrepreneurial future. They
gave him gifts of diamond stick-pins, engraved pearl-handled
revolvers, and helped him build a large house for his family.
As early as 1884, Quanah had a cattle herd large enough to
sell forty head to the government for distribution as
rations among his own people."^4
While some Indians became policemen and judges, and
some of those and others leased their land to Texas
cattlemen, at the same time the Kiowas and Comanches needed
to survive spiritually. Here too, they made their adaptations
to reservation life. No matter how many problems government
officials and missionaries encountered in getting the Indian
to adopt "civilized" pursuits, nothing frustrated them more
than the Indians' devotion to their own rituals and
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religious leaders, or "medicine men," as they were called by 
Whites. The anthropologist Clark Wissler noticed this 
about 1900:
Other Indians loitered about the agency, but not the 
medicine man; he was always going somewhere or coming, 
with the manner of one who had use for every moment of 
his time. No doubt this behavior alone was sufficient 
to arouse both respect and hostility, for to the 
churchman he was the symbol of iniquity, to the 
reformer he stood as the greatest obstacle, to the 
official he expressed the determined conservatism of 
pagan life, the self-appointed leader of the opposition. 
Even the trader had little use for him because he 
bought sparingly and set his influences against credit, 
debt, and changes in the standard of living. . . . The 
young educated Indians, many of whom had been converted 
to Christianity, would vie with each other to tell me 
how foolish and silly they believed the medicine man to 
be, but not within his hearing, for in reality they 
respected and feared what he stood f o r . 35
Many of the practices Secretary of Interior Teller
hoped to do away with when he proposed the Court of Indian
Offenses reflected the importance of religious leaders.
"Steps should be taken," said Teller, "to compel these
imposters to abondon this deception and discontinue these
practices, which are not only without benefit to the
Indians, but positively injurious to them." If found guilty
of practicing his trade, the shaman was to be jailed "for
3 6not less than ten nor more than thirty days." The Kiowa-
Comanche agent, Charles E. Adams, complained in 1890 that
"among the less intelligent the ’medicinemen' have still the
37greatest influence." These officials were well aware that 
despite their success at destroying the Indians' traditional
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buffalo hunting economy and their political institutions,
the Indians were very much alive spiritually. The shamans
had succeeded the peace and war chiefs as the most important
3 8tribal leaders during these desperate reservation years.
The modern Kiowa writer, N. Scott Momaday, wrote that
his grandmother, Aho, was seven years old when the Kiowas
gave their last Sun Dance in 1887. For the next three years,
efforts to hold this most sacred ceremony were prevented by
39the agent and the military. The Comanches were more
individualistic in their rituals than were the Kiowas, but
they did have a few communal rites. They had not held their
Beaver Ceremony or Eagle Dance for many years, and had their
40only Sun Dance in 1874.
In the late 1880s, a new pan-Indian movement began to
spread under the government's forced assimilation policy, 
designed to end Indian identity. Weston La Barre suggests 
that this development was facilitated by the intermingling 
of young Indians at the off-reservation boarding schools. 
While attempting to replace Indian culture with the 
trappings of White civilization, the schools created a 
network of inter-tribal friendships that were maintained 
through visiting and letter-writing once the Indians returned 
to their reservations.4'*' What they found among their people 
was an intensified search for spiritual renewal. This came 
from the south in the form of peyote rituals, and from the
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north through the Paiute Wovoka's vision of the Ghost Dance.
Alice Marriott has written: "There was a restlessness
running along under men's minds all through that country, and
it came down across the edges and into the Kiowa country, and •
42soon all the tribes were thinking the same things.
Amazingly enough it was Quanah, favored among cattlemen
and government officials, who according to La Barre, was "by
far the most important peyote leader among the 
"43Comanche. The use of peyote was not new to them.
Even before the middle of the nineteenth century, Comanche
warriors obtained the plant from the White Mountain Apaches,
and used it as a powerful aid in foretelling danger, and
locating horses or enemies. Since 1874, when Eschiti's
vision failed at Adobe Walls, and other traditional guardian
spirits appeared to have lost their power to resist the
Whites, peyote offered group cohesion and sacred visions to
44ease the pain of reservation life.
Whether the Kiowas obtained their peyote ritual from 
Quanah or through the Mescalero Apaches is not important 
here. They were suffering the destruction of their old way 
of life, and had to look forward to putting a plow to the 
earth, and sending their children to school. The messianic 
vision of Buffalo Coming Out, in 1881, failed to bring back 
the buffalo or stop the Whites from filling up their land. 
Peyote ceremonialism provided the Kiowas with a needed link
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with the past by integrating traditional practices such as
sweatbaths, ritual singing, drumming, smoking, prayer, and
45visions into the new reality. In Marriott’s The Ten
Grandmothers, the Kiowa Eagle Plume has gone to his first
peyote meeting near Quanah's big house. In the vision he
has his old power the mountain boomer, a bird, speak to him:
You have that Grandmother bundle. That was good power 
for your father. In his day he needed it. It is still 
good power. Anything that teaches people to live right 
is good power. But this time has come. The old power 
needs to be helped. It needs helping from the outside, 
from all the people.46
From Agent White's perspective, peyote "not only makes
physical wrecks of them in a short time, but it destroys
their mental faculties as well." He said the White settlers
living in the area "were becoming alarmed for their safety,"
knowing how much they used peyote. The agent issued an order
-to cease its use under threat of cutting off all rations,
47annuities, and grass payments. But while Quanah was a
peyote cult leader, and a judge on the Court of Indian
Offenses, no cases concerning its use were tried in his 
48court. Once the reservation was opened to White
settlement in 1901, pressure increased from missionaries
and government officials to ban the use of peyote. But
with the help of James Mooney, of the Smithsonian
Institution, the state of Oklahoma granted a charter, on
October 10, 1918, for its use as a sacrament in the Native
49American Church.
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Another ceremony offering the hope of spiritual
renewal and a return to their old way of life was the Ghost
Dance, inspired by the vision of the Paiute prophet Wovoka,
far to the northwest. The Comanches found little attraction
in this, possibly because they were so involved with peyote,
and also because they remembered the complete failure of
Eschiti1s messianic vision of 1874. The Kiowas, on the
other hand, despite two more recent unfulfilled prophesies
of Buffalo Coming Out (1881) and Pa-ingya (1887) , were
thoroughly committed to the Ghost Dance from the summer of
1890 to the spring of 1891. It should be recalled that the
Kiowas had been prevented from giving their Sun Dance since
1887; their last attempt at the great bend of the Washita
River on July 20, 1890, was disrupted by soldiers from
Fort Sill. Wrote Momaday: "My grandmother was there.
Without bitterness, and for as long as she lived, she bore
a vision of deicide."'^
Although the return of dead relatives was a feature of
the Ghost Dance, the movement itself was part of an ancient
religious tradition which saw man, animals, and the land
linked in a balanced relationship. When the buffalo
disappeared Indians believed them to have been offended and
therefore they performed the Ghost Dance mainly to restore
51the former balance. Instructed in the rite by Cheyenne 
and Arapaho neighbors, the Kiowa Poor Buffalo led the first
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Ghost Dance among his people at the Anadarko agency in the 
summer of 1890. The Arapaho Sitting Bull came down in 
October, and inspired the Kiowas with stories of his personal 
contact with Wovoka the previous winter. The Kiowas held 
hands, dancing and chanting in a circle, praying for a 
vision which would put them in touch with departed loved 
ones.
Having recently lost a young daughter, according to
Mooney, the Kiowa Apiatan, Quanah's ally on the Court of
Indian Offenses, made a pilgrimage to Wovoka to learn more.
Apiatan returned to his people disillusioned with the
Paiute's prophesies, for Wovoka had learned of the tragic
consequences of his vision at Wounded Knee and was withdrawn.
This ended the high point of dancing for the Kiowas; however
the shaman Bianki revived the Ghost Dance again in the 
52mid-1890s. Although Agent Adams could see that the Kiowas
were completely peaceful in their observance of the ceremony,
he could not go as far as Lieutenant Hugh L. Scott, leader
of the Indian Cavalry at Fort Sill, who saw the positive
social and religious aspects of these large gatherings of the
tribes. To Scott they had the feeling of the old-time
53Baptist camp meetings. He thought that if the missionaries
had been so inclined, they could have gained many converts
54through the help of Wovoka's peaceful vision.
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For the Kiowas and Comanches, the 1880s was a time of 
adjustment to the hard realities of reservation life. Most 
of the people were hungry because of reduced government 
rations, and the failure of farming. Quanah Parker emerged 
out of a pool of traditional Comanche leaders to establish 
a strong base of political power through his relations with 
a series of Indian agents and cattlemen. He may have 
profited financially, but through his efforts, the Kiowas 
and Comanches received grass payments and were living 
communally— the way they wanted to— throughout the 1890s.
The government's half-hearted program to make them into 
farmers and ranchers had failed, so they became something 
just as American: landlords. Unfortunately, the cattlemen
got the best of the deal, and the Indians were still starving. 
Despite his ties with cattlemen, Quanah maintained a position 
of respect among most of the Comanches as a teacher of 
peyote rituals, and as presiding judge on the Court of 
Indian Offenses. These were considerable accomplishments 
under such novel conditions.
The Kiowas did not have such a leader, and suffered 
greatly from the loss of their Sun Dance. They became 
faithful followers of three messiahs during the decade, in 
an effort to bring back the old way of life, all of them 
peaceful. They shared with the Comanches in receiving grass 
payments, participation in the Indian police and the Court of
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Indian Offenses, and the observance of peyote rites. In the 
face of much suffering, the two tribes found their own ways 
of selectively participating in or boycotting the 
opportunities the government offered on the reservation. 
Through the strength of their religious leaders, and men such 
as Quanah and Apiatan, who were willing to keep a foot in 
both the White and Indian worlds, they fought to meet the 
challenges of their new life.
Cheyennes and Arapahoes 
Bordering the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation north of the 
Washita River, the Sourthern Cheyenne and Southern Arapahoes 
were also suffering from hunger due to the loss of the 
buffalo, poor conditions for farming, and reduced government 
rations. Their response to the new situation was 
significantly different from that of their neighbors to the 
south. The Arapahoes were willing to settle down on 
individual plots of land, become farmers, send their children 
to school, and generally comply with the agent's program.
They were active with the Indian police and the religious 
revivals of the late 1880s. The Dog Soldier society of the 
Cheyennes, however, maintained strong control over its 
people, and prevented Indian agents from carrying out their 
programs throughout the decade, including the leasing of 
reservation land to Texas cattlemen.
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Agent John D. Miles organized the Cheyenne-Arapaho 
police force in the late 1870s, and his annual reports praise 
the "undisputed success" of his forty man force in "the 
almost total suppression of horse stealing and kindred 
crimes" on the reservation.^ John Charlton, a member of the 
Board of Indian Commissioners, had an opportunity to observe 
justice in action on an 1879 tour through western Indian 
Territory:
The Indian police here and at the Osage agency does 
admirably. The Cheyenne Indians tried a member of the 
tribe on a charge of murder, the agent acting as 
magistrate. After careful examination the defendent 
was aquitted, the agent c o n c u r r i n g .^6
The agency farmer and chief of police, J. A. Covington,
agreed with Miles that the force was underequipped and
underpayed. On the other hand, he felt they were well
placed throughout the reservation, "there being members of
the police force in every band of either tribe who reside
in the villages and are held, in a manner, responsible for
. . 57the keeping of the peace in their immediate vicxnity."
Historian William T. Hagan has called the Indian
policeman "the reservation handyman." Arresting disturbers
of the peace, and escorting trespassing cattle off the
reservation took up only a small part of their time. Their
job consisted mostly of doing or supervising the work of the
agency. Roads had to be built, irrigation ditches had to be
5 8cleaned, a census taken, and messages carried. Big Man,
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the father of Arapaho artist Carl Sweezy, was a tribal
policeman. Sweezy remembered how both a village chief and
a policeman would accompany a supply train of from 5 to 4 0
wagons up to 165- miles from the railheads in Kansas to agency
headquarters at Darlington. They shared the leadership;
their different uniforms symbolized a time of great change
in Indian society: the chief wearing buckskin, or citizens'
dress and moccasins, and the officer dressed in blue
trousers, blue blouse with gold buttons, a badge, and a blue
hat. The chief went along as a representative of the
Arapahoes' interests, the policeman represented the agent, or
as Sweeny said, "to be in authority when they reached the
town where they picked up their loads. They were off the
reservation then, and someone in authority must be
59responsible for them."
eIn his 1881 report to the Board of Indian Commissioners, 
Agent Miles spoke of the progress many of his charges were 
making along the road to civilization. Out of 1,200 
children of school age, 250 were at agency schools, 70 at 
Carlisle in Pennsylvania, and 12 at other schools in the 
states. The hauling of supplies had been a great success, 
since "not one article has been lost or damaged." Many 
Arapahoes like Powder Face, Yellow Bear, Little Raven, and 
Left Hand, and some Cheyennes such as White Shield and Wolf 
Face had begun building cattle herds, but drought over the
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last two or three years had discouraged much farming.
Concerning the police, Miles said they carried out his orders
well, but only the Arapahoes took them seriously.
. the Cheyennes still cling to the recognition of their
own 'soldier element'; but time and progress will bring it
6 0around all right in a very few years at the farthest."
The "soldier element" miles referred to was the Dog
Soldiers, which was the most powerful of the seven
traditional Cheyenne warrior societies. They were also
considered one of the ten bands making up the camp circle of
the tribe, which gathered only during the stammer months for
61communal hunts or large movements against enemy tribes. 
Possibly it was this position of great prominence within the 
tribal society which sustained the authority of the Dog 
Soldiers through the first twenty years of reservation life. 
By 1890 "time and progress" had greatly weakened their 
morale, but until then this tightly knit group completely 
usurped the authority of the tribal police and the agent on 
the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation. Their overwhelming 
influence caused the tenure of cattlemen there to be very 
short indeed.
In his last annual report on the Cheyennes and 
Arapahoes in 1885, D. B. Dyer noted, "These are nearly all 
'Blanket Indians'." He said they have no written language, 
no code of laws, no systematic government, and the Court of
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6 2Indian Offenses had not yet been established there. Not 
until the summer of 1889, after two other agents had come 
and gone, would judges be appointed by Agent Charles R. 
Ashley. White Snake, an Arapaho, and the Cheyennes Wolf 
Face and Pawnee Man made up the first triumvirate of judges. 
Considered one of the most progressive Cheyennes, Pawnee Man 
pleaded with Acting Agent Campbell, in October 1879, to 
allow his son Dick to exceed the agency's quota of students 
being sent east to school at Carlisle. In the ensuing 
years, Pawnee Man became an agency policeman, and farmed ten 
to fifteen acres of corn near Darlington. During the most 
turbulent year of the leasing controversy, 1884-1885, he 
came under strong attack from the Dog Soldiers for agreeing 
to fence and plow forty acres for the Cheyenne Boarding 
School. They threatened to kill all his horses if he 
continued the work. This seems to have had a significant 
effect on him, because from then on his actions reflected a 
confused effort to support the agent's policies, but not if
it meant defying the Dog Soldiers and the interests of his
i 63 people.
Throughout the 1890s, we find Pawnee Man desperately 
trying to find his place in the new scheme of things. In 
the 1889-1890 school year, Agent Ashley challenged the Dog 
Soldiers' policy of convincing Indian families to keep their 
children out of the agency schools. To receive rations, the
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heads of families had to present a certificate from one of
the school superintendents showing that their children were
enrolled. The Dog Soldiers, according to Ashley's report,
were enraged at the idea of "selling the children for
rations." In response to this.action, said Ashley,
"Pawnee Man," captain of the dog soldiers [sic], backed 
by eight or ten of his men, entered the commissary with 
cocked rifle and drove every person out. I was notified 
at once and immediately ordered his arrest, which was 
accomplsihed by the police without serious trouble.
When questioned by the agent, Pawnee Man said he meant no
harm, but was following the orders of his chiefs and headmen
to prevent the distribution of rations to parents who put
their children in school. Ashley chastized him, and told him
that it was the Indian police, not the Dog Soldiers "whose
duties were, under the agent, to protect them in their rights
and compel obedience and good behavior on the part of every
one." The next morning Pawnee Man had placed his daughter in
the Cheyenne Boarding School. "The schools were filled
64without further trouble," Ashley wrote.
On the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation, as previously 
indicated, the Court of Indian Offenses was allowed, with 
the concurrence of the agent, to decide many cases according 
to the Indians’ idea of justice. This did not occur among 
the Cheyenne and Arapaho, except in cases concerning property. 
When issues relating to tribal customs came before the court, 
Agent Ashley did not leave the verdict to the judges. He
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asked Pawnee Man what he thought the probable outcome would
be if polygamy was at issue. The judge said, according to
Ashley, "that God made the Indian to have as many wives as
he wanted, and an old Indian to buy a young wife if he
wanted to, and if I undertook to interfere in these matters
6 5I would get into trouble." With Judge Wolf Face agreeing
with his fellow Cheyenne on the court, and the Arapaho White
Snake supporting the agent, it is easy to see why the Court
of Indian Offenses did not survive the year 1890. The agent
hoped that young graduates of Carlisle and Haskell Institute
would eventually be able and willing to become qualified
judges on the court. At this time the "non-progressives"
6 6were too strong. Pawnee Man was willing to work hard 
along the "corn road," farming and performing his other 
duties, unless it involved violating tribal laws. His 
actions reveal an intense inner struggle with these issues 
throughout the early reservation period.
Economically, the early 1880s found the Cheyenne and 
Arapahoes in the same needy circumstances as the Kiowas and 
Comanches were to the south. Congress had cut their beef 
rations, and made further appropriations very uncertain.
The Indians were hungry, and the cattlemen were anxious to 
use the lush grass on the reservation. By 1882, progressive 
Cheyennes like Little Robe and Cohoe were getting $350 to 
$500 a month in cash for their bands from the Dickey
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Brothers, who were grazing 22,500 cattle just within the
reservation's northern boundary, near the army post of
Cantonment. To regulate these leases, and to provide for
a more equal distribution of grass money among both tribes,
Agent Miles called for a council between Cheyenne and
Arapaho chiefs, and representatives from the cattlemen on
December 19, 1882. With the support of the agency staff,
traders, intermarried Whites, a few mixed bloods, and money
provided by the cattlemen to persuade the Indians, 17
Cheyenne and 9 Arapaho chiefs signed an agreement to lease
6 72.4 million of their 4.3 million acres.
All of the parties involved awaited a response from 
Interior Secretary Henry M. Teller, as to the legal status 
of the proposed lease agreement. With Congress alone 
empowered to alter Indian treaties, Teller was careful not 
to give the ranchers the impression that they were getting 
leases that were legally binding. They were being allowed 
temporary permits to graze, and were to be protected 
against other cattlemen who did not have such permits. 
Cheyennes and Arapahoes were to be hired as herders, and 
as long as they did not molest the herds the Indians were
6 8to be allowed to graze their ponies anywhere they pleased.
John H. Seger, who served on the reservation as a 
teacher, builder, and farmer for over 50 years, used Indians 
to build over 300 miles of fence for the cattlemen at this
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time. According to him, the way the new leaseholders behaved
angered even the progressive chiefs. "Most of the men who
held cattle in the Cheyenne and Arapaho country," said 
Seger, "were Texas men who were prejudiced against the 
Indians." They continued to use the White cowboys they were 
familiar with, and refused to hire Indians eager to make 
money herding and mending fences. They also became alarmed 
when they found Cheyennes and Arapahoes grazing their pony 
herds on the leases, fearing they might steel cattle or burn 
the grass. Thus, the situation worsened among the Indians 
who had supported leasing and who now found themselves 
forced off their land, spending time around the agency with 
nothing to do.®^
During the summer of 1883, resistance against leasing
began to develop among about 700 Cheyennes, who were living
in bands near Cantonment. Cantonment was about 50 miles 
northwest of Darlington, on the North Fork of the Canadian 
River, just south of the Cherokee Outlet. These Cheyennes, 
led by Chiefs Little Robe, Stone Calf, and White Shield 
refused to accept their share of the first semiannual 
distribution of grass money. The chiefs said that they had 
not signed the leasing agreements from the previous winter, 
and that they were being forced off their land. To add fuel 
to the flames, on October 15 Agent Miles issued a grazing 
license to cattleman George E. Reynolds for 714,249 acres
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of land around Cantonment, on the land of the dissenting 
Cheyenne bands. Faced with a critical report of his agency 
by Indian Inspector Robert S. Gardner, and growing dissent 
among the Cheyennes, Miles resigned on March 31, 1884, after 
a tenure of twelve years. He was the last active agent in 
western Indian Territory to have been appointed under 
Grant's Peace Policy. He did his best to provide the 
Indians with the skills and experience to help them 
assimilate into American life. Miles had pledged earlier
that if his leasing program was rejected he would resign.
70The Dog Soldiers proved to be more than a match for him.
Miles was replaced the next day by D. B. Dyer, who, 
according to Donald J. Berthrong, "was a brusque and stubborn 
man who expected his smallest wish to be granted immediately 
by his charges; the Cheyennes would make no such capitulation
t 71to any man." As starvation increased, especially among
those who refused grass money, the Dog Soldiers became more
active. Indian children were taken out of school, tribal
ceremonies were conducted more openly, and large numbers of
cattle were being killed for food. In his first annual
report, Agent Dyer painted a grim picture:
It is the practice of the "dog soldiers" to compel the 
attendance of all Indians on their medicine making, and 
on refusal of one to attend his teepee is cut up, 
chickens, hogs, and cattle killed, growing crops 
destroyed; they rule with an iron hand, and their will 
right or wrong, is absolute law.72
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Not all of the Cheyennes living near Cantonment were 
against leasing. Some had been dealing with cattlemen in the 
Cherokee Outlet for years. They had developed their own 
network of trade, independent of the government agent. Non- 
Indian men married to Indian women— squaw men, like Amos 
Chapman and Wesley Warren— had served as intermediaries 
between the cattlemen and the Indians. The Indians were 
making more money this way, and were becoming independent 
entrepreneurs. Of course, the reservation was owned by both 
tribes, and therefore the agent was compelled to act in the 
interests of all the Indians. But no one like Quanah Parker 
emerged from the pro-leasing faction, who was able to gain 
enough support among the Cheyennes and Arapahoes to push 
the leasing program through.
The independent spirit of the Dog Soldiers was 
demonstrated on May 4, 1884, when the Dog Soldier Running 
Buffalo refused to allow Texan E. M. Horton to drive a herd 
of 400 horses across his land to ford the North Canadian 
River. After Running Buffalo shot into Horton's herd in an 
effort to stampede them, Horton or one of his men shot and 
killed the Dog Soldier. The Texan and his men quickly fled 
to Cantonment, where the Menonite missionary, Reverend 
S. S. Haury gave them refuge in the stone bakery, and put 
their horses in the corral. The next day, upon the arrival 
of Indian policemen and a troop of cavalry from Fort Reno,
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Left Hand Bull convinced the Dog Soldiers who had gathered to
accept an offer to release the prisoners in exchange for half
of Horton's horses. This was done, but Horton's horses were
eventually returned to him. These kinds of confrontations,
occurring far from the agency, made Dyer feel helpless:
"The Indians know that those in charge here are powerless as
things now are, hence they defy all authority whenever they
see fit." He demanded that the Dog Soldiers be disarmed, and
7 3500 soldiers be sent to reinforce the cavalry at Fort Reno.
Over the next year the Dog Soldiers did as they pleased,
making life very hard for the agent. The Indian police had
to spend much of their time protecting cattle drovers from
them as they roamed the reservation killing cattle to relieve 
74their hunger. The policemen, who tried so hard to satisfy
the agent, suffered tremendous harrassment at the hands of
their angry fellow tribesmen. While Pawnee Man was carrying
out Agent Dyer's orders to cut posts to fence forty acres
of land for the Cheyenne Boarding School, the Dog Soldiers
threatened to kill all his horses. After graduating from
Carlisle, the Cheyenne White Buffalo found work in the agency
tin shop. Because of his education and position, he was
verbally attacked by the Dog Soldier Mad Wolf. The pressure
caused him to quit his job and return to the camps of his 
75people. The Arapahoes also suffered from these attacks.
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Left Hand Bull killed six of Chief Little Raven's ponies, and
7 6destroyed the fencing around Horse Back's land.
Early in July 1885, Indian Inspector Frank C. Armstrong
was sent to the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation to investigate
the turmoil over leasing. After holding interviews,
Armstrong recommended that the Indian soldier societies take
over the jobs of Indian policemen and scouts at Fort Reno,
and that they should be trained by army personnel. He heard
complaints from Cheyennes who had signed the leasing
agreement back in 1882, and from those who had not, and felt
that the cattlemen's licenses should be revoked. Armstrong
also thought that there were too many Whites on the
77reservation, and that they should have to leave.
On July 15, 1885 Generals Philip H. Sheridan and 
Nelson A. Miles arrived in Darlington to do their own 
investigation. Stone Calf spoke for the dissident Cheyennes. 
He decried the killing of Running Buffalo by Horton at 
Cantonment, and said that the cattlemen, and the traders and 
squaw men who served their interests, should be removed from 
the reservation. Other Cheyenne chiefs said that Whites had 
either stolen some of their cattle, or they had somehow been 
absorbed into their herds. Even Whirlwind, a Cheyenne chief 
who had signed the agreement, said he had done so under 
pressure from the trader George Bent, and that his people 
were being unjustly accused of crimes. Powder Face, an
93
Arapaho chief for sixteen years, also complained that the 
cattlemen were driving his people out of camps they had 
lived in since they came on the reservation a decade ago.
The generals also took testimony from cattlemen like
Ed Fenlon, who denied all of the Indians' accusations, and
put the blame for the turmoil back onto the Dog Soldiers.
Nevertheless, the reports of these investigators, along with
an opinion by Attorney General Augustus H. Garland, that the
cattlemen had no legal standing on the reservation, caused
President Grover Cleveland, on July 23, ’to order the removal
of the cattle from the reservation within forty days.
General Sheridan removed Agent Dyer, and replaced him with
Captain Jesse M. Lee of the Ninth Infantry. The military
agent enforced the removal of the cattle, which was completed
by November 6, 1885. Leasing on this reservation had come 
7 8to an end.
Most of the Arapahoes had been willing to tender 
grazing privileges to the cattlemen, and to follow the 
agent's lead in most matters concerning their eventual 
progress on the road to assimilation. The prominence the 
Dog Soldiers maintained on the reservation, however, gave 
the Cheyennes the strength to hold on to their old ways 
longer, and gain enough support from important government 
leaders to drive the cattlemen off the reservation. They 
exerted more power, by far, than the Indian policemen, and
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consequently defeated all efforts by the agents to control
them. It was a victory for self-determination, but it left
the Cheyennes and Arapahoes short of funds needed to feed
their families. Also, as Berthrong has pointed out, with the
cattlemen on their side the Indians may have been able to
delay the allotment of their lands under the Dawes Act of 
791887.
Religious revivals occurred on the Cheyenne-Arapaho
Reservation too during this period. The Ghost Dance took
a firm hold among the Arapahoes. As Mooney and Wissler
have noted, the agency and boarding schools gave the Indian
children the skills to write letters to each other in
English. Southern Arapahoes and Cheyennes were informed of
the teachings of Wovoka through letters sent from friends
8 0they had made at eastern boarding schools. The fact that 
an Arapaho man like Black Coyote was an officer of the agency 
force, and was specifically charged with discouraging 
traditional religious practices, did not prevent him from 
being a leader of the Ghost Dance. Early in 1890, Black 
Coyote, along with Washee, also a policeman, and the 
Cheyenne Tall Bull made a pilgrimage north to see Wovoka. 
Washee returned early, falsely believing that the reputed 
second Christ was a half-blood. Black Coyote returned in 
April 1890, fully committed to teaching the songs and dances 
he had learned to his brethren in the south. Tall Bull
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remained with Black Coyote in Nevada, but was not impressed 
with Wovoka's vision. The Cheyennes were not committed
to the Ghost Dance to the extent that the Arapaho were.
81They tended to join the Arapaho dances as individuals.
During the summer of 1890, according to Mooney, the
Ghost Dances were going all night, two or three times a
week. After the Arapaho Sitting Bull, an early disciple of
Wovoka, came down from Nevada in September, and made his
camp east of Cantonment, the dancing became even more
intense. But government officials did not seem to mind the
increased activity. A Member Of the Board of Indian
Commissioners, John Charlton, observed:
They have had the "Messiah" craze in a mild form since 
last summer when they held their "ghost” dance and 
indulged in the ecstasies of that, to them, solemn
service; but in no case that has come to my knowledge
has there been any demonstration that could be 
tortured in the belief that they wished to disturb 
the amicable relations existing between themselves 
and their white neighbors.
It was so peaceful that the wife of former Agent Dyer was
not afraid to travel across the reservation with a guide
during this time, and to spend the night, according to her,
"in a wild and dreaded Cheyenne camp, entirely at the mercy
8 2of the savages, comparatively unprotected."
Agent Ashley was not as adamant about stopping the 
Ghost Dance, however he wanted the ceremonies held no 
closer than five miles from the agency schools. After 
Black Coyote and Tall Bull had returned from visiting
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Wovoka, he refused to allow others to make the trip. Things 
quieted down considerably after the Cheyennes and Arapahoes 
received a letter from the Shoshoni Agency, stating "that 
Christ had written to the Great Father at Washington notifying 
him to remove the whites within two years or they would all 
be destroyed." After this, said Ashley, "the Indians
8 3decided to remain quiet the two years on the reservation."
Two contemporary descriptions of Black Coyote reflect
the transitional nature of that time:
Black Coyote in full uniform, with official badge, a 
Harrison medal, and an immense police overcoat, which 
he procured in Washington, and riding with his three 
wives in his own double-seated coach, is a spectacle 
magnificent and impressive. Black Coyote in 
breechcloth, paint, and feathers, leading the Ghost 
Dance, or sitting flat on the ground and beating the 
earth with his hand in excess of religious fervor, is 
equally impressive.^
Although dressed in his dark blue uniform, glittering 
with buttons of polished brass and a great expanse of 
immaculate shirt-front, he wore adornments enough of 
savage insignias to make him picturesque, . . .
To Mrs. Dyer, even Black Coyote's "dingy moccasins wherein
8 5he clothed his feet savored of the wild and romantic."
It is obvious that men like Quanah, Pawnee Man, and 
Black Coyote were enigmas to White observers because of 
their success at adopting certain trappings of the White 
culture, without losing touch with who they were as 
Cheyennes, Comanches, etc. While Whites were bemoaning the 
disappearance of the Redman, the Indians were making the
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changes necessary to survive as Indians. Fortunately, the
Ghost Dance remained peaceful among the tribes of western
Indian Territory. Even though they were held during the
crucial farming months, men like Ashley, Scott, and Mooney
were able to see what was beneficial in the dancing, and
what the consequences would be in breaking them up. In
October 1892 Sitting Bull, his wife, and Washee led another
group to see Wovoka. This time even Sitting Bull became
discouraged when the prophet told them he was tired of
8 6visitors, and that they should stop dancing.
As the Ghost Dance lost adherents, the use of peyote
among the Arapahoes increased. La Barre cites the case of
the Arapaho Jock Bullbear, who upon his return from Carlisle
in 1884 may have obtained peyote from the Comanches. Other
accounts say that in 1888 Medicine Bird, who may have been
Chief Left Hand, learned about peyote from the Kiowas,
Apaches, or Caddoes. The Southern Cheyennes did not begin
to use peyote until 1901, when they learned the peyote rite
of Quanah Parker through the Kiowas. Each tribe developed
their own variations according to earlier tribal practices
or the personalities of their leaders. An innovation of
the Cheyennes and Arapahoes was to give presents to friends
89and visitors m  the morning, at the ceremony's end.
Agent A. E. Woodson did not have the religious 
tolerance of his predecessor. Throughout most of the 1890s,
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the agent did his best to prohibit all traditional Indian 
religion. He worked especially hard on a bill submitted to 
the Oklahoma territorial legislature outlawing the use of 
peyote and the practices of Indian religious leaders. With 
the help of Senator Geroge W. Ballamy, of the Oklahoma 
Territorial Council, Woodson's "mescal and medicine man" 
bill was passed and signed by Governor C. M. Barnes, despite 
the protests of many Indians. Nevertheless, peyote 
ceremonials continued to unite the Cheyennes and Arapahoes 
in their own world, separate from the Whites. According to 
Trenholm it helped them control their drinking, escape the 
oppressive life of the reservation in a protective group 
atmosphere.^
With such similar environments and opportunities, the 
two reservations of western Indian Territory made very 
different responses to reservation life in the 1880s. The 
Kiowas and Comanches, while not united, did make concessions 
to the cattlemen and Indian agents that they thought would 
benefit their tribes. It appears, however, that the 
Arapahoes and Cheyennes, although peaceful towards each 
other, could not have been more different in their attitudes 
concerning their agents and the cattlemen who wanted to use 
their land.
The Arapahoes wanted to farm and to cooperate with the 
agents' programs. Dog Soldiers like Stone Calf and Left
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Hand Bull felt that they should be able to make their own 
arrangements with the cattlemen, without the agents' 
interference. Their distaste for the agents' attitudes 
kept both tribes from making the adjustments in their 
economic lives which they would eventually have to face.
While the Arapahoes were willing to farm and send their 
children to school, they were the most active in the Ghost 
Dance and peyote rituals, which united them in their continued 
identification as Indians.
Santee and Yanktonais Sioux 
From the southern plains, we again shift our focus 900 
miles north to the northeastern part of Dakota Territory.
Of the three reservations examined, the one at Devils Lake 
seemed to have been following the government's model for the 
Indians' progress most closely during the 1880s. Both the 
Indian police and the Court of Indian Offenses were 
established and functioning soon after the commissioner of 
Indian affairs announced their formation. With the 
speculative boom in wheat farming, and the proliferation of 
markets in the first half of the decade, the ideal of the 
yeoman farmer appeared to be growing naturally out of 
American soil. Even the pan-Indian religious revival which 
swept over so many tribes on the plains, did not penetrate 
the air of Catholic devotion which had influenced the 
reservation since its inception. But, with the downward
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turn in the economy in the last half of the decade, drought,
and the departure of Agent John W. Cramsie, the ideal
economy of Devils Lake collapsed.
Agent James McLaughlin established a five-man Indian
police force in 1878. Four years later, under a new agent,
its ranks had grown to fifteen members. Considering the
low salary of $15 a month, said Agent John W. Cramsie, they
are all that could be expected of them, and perform 
their duties cheerfully and promptly and watch with a 
jealous eye any signs of infringement by whites on the 
reservation. Since receiving their revolvers quite a 
noticeable difference is perceptible in their bearing 
and manner.^
The police watched for cattle owned by Whites drifting onto
the reservation, and guarded the agency's wood reserve from
poachers. They stayed sober, and kept the peace among their
90fellow tribesmen.
In 1883 Cramsie appointed three men to the Court of 
Indian Offenses. The reservation was divided into three 
school districts, and the judge who lived in the district 
was responsible for making sure the children attended school. 
At first there was no pay allowed for the judges, and the 
agent wondered whether men of quality could be found under 
such conditions. But soon, Cramsie began to marvel at the 
judges' ability to get at the facts in a dispute between 
Indians, "whereas a white man could be fooled, as they 
express it." He also appreciated being free of "much
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disagreeable work and odium in connection with the duty of 
imposing fines or imprisonment upon offenders." During
1884, out of forty-two cases, thirty-four resulted in
91sentences. The next year, the agent began to notice that 
the judges were not as committed to their positions as 
they had been at first. He wanted to remedy this by paying
them a per diem for their services out of the $186 in fines
92collected. By 1887, after the novelty of being a judge,had
worn off, and funds to pay them were still scarce, Cramsie
moaned, "now it is about impossible to get a good intelligent
93man to accept the position."
Four years later, the Court of Indian Offenses was still
meeting every other Saturday in the agency council chamber.
All the police attended the hearings, and reported on the
violations in their districts. The head farmer served as
clerk. Three judges who served in this period were Waanatau,
a Cut Head chief; Tiowaste, a Wahpeton chief; and
Ecauajinka, a chief of the Sissetons. The policeman in
whose district the offense occurred announced the case, and
asked for witnesses. The accused defended him or herself,
the judges deliberated, and then imposed the penalty of
"a small sum of money, a few cords of wood, tons of hay, or 
94a pony."
Polygamy was no longer a problem (except among older 
Indians), according to the next agent, John W. Waugh.
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He said they were mostly "monogomists," but still many cases
of desertion, rape, bastardy, and adultery came before the
court. Other offenses were gambling, drunkenness, assault
95and battery, and medicine making.
Just as a boom in the cattle industry had opened up
opportunities for some Indians of western Indian Territory
to become more independent, so the boom in wheat farming in
the Dakotas gave the Devils Lake Sioux similar opportunities.
The arrival of speculative capital with the railroads, and
sufficient rainfall made the years 1879-1886 profitable for
many Dakotans, both Indian and White.^ In the mid-1870s,
Oliver Dalrymple, a Yale-educated lawyer, demonstrated the
great potential of settling and raising wheat along the
Northern Pacific railroad line. Due to his successes,
improved flour milling in Minneapolis, and the railroad
building energies Of James J. Hill, the Dakotas east of the
Missouri River were settled by 1885. The population of
North Dakota had risen 400 percent, from 37,000 in 1880 to
97152.000 in 1885. These developments were a mixed blessing
to the Santee and Yanktonais Sioux of the Devils Lake
Reservation. During 1883, a branch of Hill's St. Paul,
Minneapolis, and Manitoba railroad came west from Grand
Forks to the north shore of Devils Lake. A community of
White settlers was established there, quickly growing to
9 81.000 inhabitants by December 1884.
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John W. Cramsie was appointed agent in 1881, after
James McLaughlin was transferred to Standing Rock Agency.
In 1867, Cramsie was an employee of the Quartermaster
Department at nearby Fort Totten, and because he spoke the
Sioux language, Lakota, he was assigned to take a census of
the Indians and to distribute their rations. He also served
as an interpreter under the first agent, Major Forbes.
Roy W. Meyer has written that "he was thoroughly familiar
with the situation at Devils Lake and apparently in sympathy
99with the policies followed by Forbes and McLaughlin.
During the 1880s in North Dakota, this meant
continuing the effort toward total self-support through
agriculture. Although Cramsie was well aware of the
expansion of the huge bonanza wheat farms on all sides of
the reservation, he still saw the solution to "the Indian
problem" to be represented by a verse he quoted in his
annual report: "We'll have a little farm, a horse, a pig
and cow; and she will mind the dairy and I will guide the
plow."100 Even though this romantic image of the yeoman
farmer did not reflect the realities of the farming
business in America,101 Cramsie worked long and hard to
make it come true for his charges. He encouraged them to
increase their acreage under cultivation yearly, and helped
102them procure the most modern farm machinery.
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The agents praised their most successful Sioux farmers
in their annual reports "to show what an Indian has done and
what many others are doing, . . . "  In 1880 Mclaughlin cited
the fifty year old Shipto (Sipto) who, with his family's
help, "has now 50 acres inclosed with a good 8-rail fence,
103well staked and ridered, and uniformly built; . . .
Four years later, Sipto had purchased his own self-raker, and
104was considered the best farmer on the reservation. Agent
Cramsie noted a group of ten enterprising farmers who "have 
selected places out on the prairie, and have broken from 10 
to 20 acres each to sow to wheat next season." Led by 
"Oyesna," they expressed a desire collectively to purchase 
a self-binder. Cramsie told them it would cost $300, and 
that he would put up the difference for them until they sold 
their grain. With $88.50 put up by the ten farmers, and 
$192 from his own money, they were able to purchase a 
"McCormick self-binder" for $280 .
In 1882, 1884, and 1889, for example, the number of
acres under cultivation at Devils Lake was 1,500, 2,480,
106and 5,500 respectively, with about half to wheat.
Since all ration issues were stopped in 1884, except to the 
old and infirm, and the annual appropriation from Congress 
was so small, the Sioux had to develop a cash economy. They 
supplied the agency and its schools with wheat by selling 
it to the trader, who ground it at the agency grist mill for
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$2.50 per hundred lbs., and then sold it to the agency.
Besides the agency buying much of the surplus crops, the 
trader proved to be a very good market for the fruits of 
their other labor too. In 1885, one of the best years, the 
trader paid the Indians $6,000 for various "sundries," 
including:
Down wood, 1,500 cords at $3 per cord, $4,500; wheat,
700 bushels at 55 cents per bushel, $380; bran, 10,000 
pounds, at 50 cents per cwt, $50; buffalo bones, 190 
tons, $800; hay, 60 tons, at $4 per ton, $240; potatoes, 
150 bushels, at 30 cents per bushel, $45.
Also, reflecting the tail end of the speculative boom going
on throughout Dakota Territory, the towns like Devils Lake
and surrounding communities purchased $8,000 worth of similar
items. And finally, the Devils Lake Sioux were proud to sell
some of their surplus wheat to their old enemies, the
107Chippewas of Turtle Mountain, who lived just north of them.
Like Oliver Dalrymple, who had become famous by 
adapting the great organizational skills of large industry 
to the bonanza farm, John W. Cramsie, on a somewhat smaller 
scale, tried very hard to increase the organization, 
mechanization, and efficiency of wheat farming on the 
reservation. He encouraged neighbors to combine their 
resources to buy the necessary self-binders, mowing-machines, 
horse-rakes, fanning mills, and seeders. He preferred to 
use "American horse teams" over work oxen because of their 
speed, which could make a great difference during the
106
harvest. In 1887 he complained to the commissioner that if
progress was to be maintained toward the government's goal
of civilizing the Indian, he must receive more funds to buy
the machinery necessary to keep pace with their increased
108wheat production. Cramsie felt that if he had a skilled
White farmer as an instructor for every twenty-five Indians,
he could compete with "the other extensive and bonanza wheat
and stock farms of Dakota." Without this needed assistance,
'"the advancement of the Indians" cannot "be otherwise than
109slow and up-hill work."
Despite Cramsie's dissatisfaction, the Devils Lake 
Sioux had accomplished a great deal during the 1880s. They 
had settled on individual parcels of land, organized clubs 
to purchase the necessary farm machinery to work their farms, 
found markets for everything from down timber to buffalo 
bones, and hauled freight until the nearness of the railroad 
eliminated that as a source of income. They had come a long 
way towards supporting themselves by their own efforts in a 
market economy. But in 1889 Cramsie reported that the early 
frosts of the last year had caused the Indians' crop yields 
to be low, and the current drought was expected to have 
similar results. He appealed for government aid for 
clothing, food, and seed for next year. In the conclusion 
of what he thought would be his last report (there would be 
one more), he stated bluntly: "The magnitude of the
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undertaking is not understood nor appreciated by Congress, 
or money sufficient would be appropriated to accomplish the 
object in view."11^
The Whites in North Dakota did not do too well either 
after the boom was over, and many left the area.^"'" The 
Devils Lake Sioux could not leave. Except for 1891, drought 
foiled their efforts at farming the next few years, and they 
did not make an effort to develop cattle herds with the stock 
issued to them by the government. Their crops had been 
depended on for cash to pay the trader, and now they had 
little credit left. According to their agent in 1892,
"Fifty per cent of them will not have a dollar to live on 
this winter."112
The future for most Devils Lake Indians looked bleak.
Meyer has written: "From a condition at least approaching
self-sufficiency, the Devils Lake Indians slipped back in a
few years to almost total dependence on government 
113assistance." In addition to the failure of the economy
and their farming efforts, Agent Cramsie departed in 1890.
For twenty-three years he had served these Indians, the last 
nine as agent, carrying on in the paternalistic, reforming 
spirit of his predecessors, Forbes and McLaughlin. While 
most of the Indians worked only 5-10 acres, a few succeeded 
on farms of 50-60 acres. It is a reflection of the 
perseverence and continuity of these agents' efforts to lead
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their charges to becoming independent farmers, that so much 
was accomplished during the 1880s. But the majority of 
Indians were just getting by. No doubt the departure of 
Cramsie during hard times gave a dormant resistance to the 
policies of the last twenty years a chance to emerge.
In religious matters, the practice of Catholicism was 
dominant throughout the 1880s. The Devils Lake Indians did 
not use peyote or participate in the Ghost Dance, although 
the latter caused quite a scare for the surrounding White
t
communities in 1890. In the late 1870s, McLaughlin made a
concerted effort to eliminate all Indian ceremonies from the
reservation, and to indoctrinate the children into
Catholicism through the reservation boarding school run by
the Grey Nuns of Montreal. Later, Agent Cramsie happily
reported on the progress of "Reverend Jerome Hunt, O.S.B.,
a zealous worker and eloquent preacher in the Sioux language,
is fast dispelling the prejudices and superstitions of the
Indians, and instructing them in the knowledge of the
Christian religion." With Hunt's guidance, a society of
St. Joseph was formed, under whose banner Indians came to
church once a month to receive holy communion. Said
Cramsie, "On these monthly meetings it is truly an
encouraging sight to see men, young and old, who have
promised to discard and abandon all Indians habits and 
,,114customs, . . .
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Whether the agent really believed the Indians of Devils
Lake could "discard and abandon" who they were with such
ease, the annual reports are filled with such wishful
thinking. It is true that compared to the Kiowas,
Comanches, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and the Teton Sioux, his
Indians were much more tractable, but we see in various
reports from years later that they had not lost their "Indian
habits and customs." When James McLaughlin returned to
Devils Lake as an Indian inspector in 1895, he was very
disappointed at how the agent had allowed conditions to
deteriorate. According to McLaughlin's biographer, Reverend
Louis Pfaller, he found that the non-progressive element had
even taken control of the Indian police and judges, and
115"were permitting polygamy and wxld dances to grow.
This was a sure sign that an agent had lost the control 
McLaughlin felt was necessary to civilize the Indian.
Without control, even the subdued Devils Lake people openly 
defied the Great White Father. Into the early 1920s, the 
older people were holding traditional dances regularly 
throughout the reservation, and the tribal police and the 
Court of Indian Offenses were still functioning.116 Thus, 
we see that traditional Indian culture had not died at 
Devils Lake.
But this had not happened by 1889-1891 when the Ghost 
Dance was spreading throughout the Great Plains. Just
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southwest of Devils Lake, along the west bank of the Missouri
River, the Sioux who had fought Custer were promulgating
the most anti-White of all the Ghost Dances. The Miniconjou
Sioux band chief, Kicking Bear, was among the group of
Teton Sioux, Northern Cheyenne, and Shoshonis who visited
Wovoka in Nevada early in 1890. Also in this delegation
was Sitting Bull, the Arapaho who, as we have seen, brought
his fervent, but peaceful interpretation of Wovoka's vision
117to his relatives in western Indian Territory. When
Kicking Bear returned to his home on the Cheyenne River
Reservation, he became one of the most devout proponents of
the Teton Sioux version of the Ghost Dance. This would not
only bring back the buffalo and dead relatives, but would
also "wipe the white race from the earth;" a catalysm which
118was supposed to occur some time in the spring of 1891.
On the adjoining Standing Rock Reservation to the 
north, lived the notorious Hunkpapa Sioux chief and religious 
leader, Sitting Bull and his nemesis, Agent James McLaughlin. 
Being the leading nonprogressive among the entire Sioux 
tribe, the old warrior was a persistant thorn in McLaughlin's 
hard-line civilization program. In June 1890, McLaughlin 
told the commissioner of Indian affairs that he sensed no 
danger of an uprising at Standing Rock, but he would like 
nonprogressive leaders like Sitting Bull, Circling Bear,
Black Bird, and Circling Hawk removed from the reservation.
Ill
Since Sitting Bull had not broken any law, this could not 
be done."''^^
During the summer Sitting Bull made a number of 
requests for permission to visit Kicking Bear to learn about 
the messiah. The preachings of Kicking Bear and his 
brother-in-law Short Bull were known to the agent, so he 
refused to allow Sitting Bull to go. The chief then sent 
some of his own followers to invite Kicking Bear to come to 
his camp on the Grand River. Kicking Bear agreed, and 
brought Wovoka1s prophesies and dances to Sitting Bull and 
his followers on October 9, 1890. As the dancing began to 
intensify on Grand River, McLaughlin wrote a long letter on 
October 17 to Commissioner Morgan explaining the visit of 
Kicking Bear, the violent atmosphere of the Ghost Dance, his
feelings about Sitting Bull, and the necessity of arresting
. . 120 him.
Morgan leaked the letter to the press, and almost 
immediately fear spread through the White communities of 
North Dakota. The people of Mandan and Bismark, north of 
Standing Rock, thought an attack was imminent. Because the 
Devils Lake Indians were so peaceful, almost all of Company 
C, 22nd Infantry, at nearby Fort Totten rode to reinforce 
Fort Yates, the closest post to Sitting Bull's camp. Once 
the troops had left Fort Totten, the citizens of the town of 
Devils Lake petitioned Governor Miller for enough guns to
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raise a militia. D. S. Dodds said that the Devils Lake 
Indians had wanted to have a Ghost Dance the previous week, 
but Agent Waugh stopped them. He feared that only 11 Indian
policemen, and 5 White agency employees with 15 guns and
. . 121 ammunition between them, were no match for 400 mad Indians.
A year later Waugh reviewed the situation:
During the late outbreak, when many Indians worked 
themselves up to such a pitch as to become frenzied 
from continued ghost dancing, the Indians of this 
reservation remained cool, quiet, and tranquil, although 
the timidity of some of the settlers near by gave rise 
to the sending out of sensational and dynamite reports 
as to their temper and disposition. Not a single Indian 
from this reservation joined the hostilities.
He also congratulated himself on the absence of dancing in
general, "and the growing disposition to look upon it with
122disfavor by the Indians themselves."
With the buffalo long gone, the Santee and Yantonais 
Sioux camped near Devils Lake in the late 1860s were hungry, 
and anxious for a stable relationship with the United States 
government. The three agents who served them for the first 
two decades of reservation life were honest men, who strove 
with the commitment of belief to hold their Indians to a 
program of eventual assimilation into the American 
mainstream. With Indians who saw little use in exerting 
their independence, and agents who held them firmly in 
check, few innovations outside the agents’ modus operandi 
took place. Some men, like Sipto and Oyesna, successfully
113
farmed over fifty acres and bought farm machinery with the 
profits. During the 1880s they found markets for their 
surplus crops with the agency trader, the Turtle Mountain 
Chippewas, and nearby White communities. Drought and the 
failure of many bonanza farms and railroads throughout North 
Dakota at the end of the decade, brought the good times 
enjoyed by few Indians to an abrupt end. The Indian police 
and the Court of Indian Offenses were active throughout the 
1880s, and continued to give the Devils Lake Sioux control 
of their own lives into the next century. Although open 
performance of traditional religious rituals were prohibited 
under Cramsie, it emerged again after his departure. The 
Ghost Dance and peyote rites, so popular further out on the 
plains, never developed at Devils Lake. Despite the 
relative success of his efforts, Cramsie left blaming 
Congress' lack of support for the depressed condition his 
Indians had again reached.
These three case studies reflect the unique 
personalities of the five Indian tribes involved. Despite 
relatively recent military defeats at the hands of the U.S. 
Army and a policy of forced assimilation on their own land, 
each tribe responded courageously and purposefully to the 
political, economic, and religious options available to them 
on the reservation. They retained what they could of their
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traditional cultures, and brought vestiges of the old to 
what was new.
The religious leaders held the allegiance of the 
people as keepers of their spiritual traditions, the one 
area of their lives which remained inaccessible to most White 
men. While the roles of the peace and war chiefs disappeared 
with the buffalo, the reservation milieu offered men like 
Quanah, Pawnee Man, Sitting Bull, Apiatan, Black Coyote, 
Sipto, and Oyesna chances to assume leadership roles which 
may not have been available to them before. These men were 
under pressure from the agent to lead their people away from 
Indian values towards the individualsim of the American way. 
But, although they were making every effort to adapt to the 
new life, these men seldom abandoned their loyalty to their 
peoples and their traditions. The Cheyenne Dog Soldiers 
were still strong enough to flaunt the authority of Agent 
Dyer and to eliminate the leasing of grass to cattlemen on 
the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation.
With these experiences and accomplishments to their 
credit, these tribes then had to face another assault on 
their lands as the General Allotment Act was implemented in 
the early 1890s. The next chapter will explore how these 
tribes responded to this new challenge, and clarify if it 
in fact helped or hindered the assimilation process.
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CHAPTER 3
WORK OR STARVE
Concurrent with the attempt by the tribes and their 
agents to come to terms with the new realities of 
reservation life, White Christian reformers and government 
officials were fashioning legislation that would forcibly 
end tribal relations and attempt to assimilate the Indian 
as an individual into the American mainstream. The 
traditional policy of isolating groups of Indians from 
avaricious whites before the Civil War was no longer 
practical. The new government policy encouraged the Indians 
to adopt the competitive individualism of the White Americans 
and immigrants who were fast becoming their neighbors.
It was through their communal institutions, however, 
that many of the Indians during the 1800s, made significant 
progress in adapting to the White man's culture, as well as 
surviving its dislocation. The agent for the Devils Lake 
Sioux urged them to work adjacent sections of land in groups 
so that they could raise enough wheat to buy more machinery 
to expand their operations further. Lieutenant Hugh L.
Scott, the head of the Indian Scouts at Fort Sill, saw the 
positive benefits of the Ghost Dance for the tribes of 
western Indian Territory. He approved of the Christian
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influences he saw integrated into the native ceremony.
Despite these and other adaptations that were slowly 
evolving, many reformers felt that there was no more time 
to waste. The signing of the Dawes General Allotment Act 
on February 8 , 1887 completed an old government effort to 
make the Indian survive on equal terms with the White man.
It was clear to seventeenth century colonials, said 
Francis Paul Prucha, that Indians who chose to live among 
the English should hold land and other property individually 
according to English custom. In the early days of the 
American republic, men like Henry Knox and Thomas Jefferson 
endowed the idea of the individual landholder with the power 
of "transforming the Indians into acceptable members of 
white society."^ This idea was incorporated into the treaties 
made between the United States and various Indian tribes, 
whose leaders bargained away large cessions of land for 
smaller areas in severalty (individual possession). To 
insure against the free alienation of the land, the 
government usually did not allow the Indians to hold the 
land in fee, with unrestricted title. If voluntarily 
abandoned, the land would become the property of the United 
States and be redistributed according to specific procedures 
or with the consent of the President. However, in the few 
cases where patents in fee were given, as with the 
Brothertown Indians of Wisconsin, theOttawas, Chippawas,
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Potawatomis, Shawnees and Wyandots, the Indians soon sold 
their lands and spent the small amount of money they were 
given for them. In any case, from 1853 on most treaties 
included the taking of land in severalty as an important 
feature.^
"It is a part of the Indian's religion not to divide 
the land," said Colorado Senator Henry M. Teller in 
January 1881. He told his fellow Senators that of the 
"sixty-odd treaties with Indians" made over the past thirty 
years, most "have taken the land in severalty, attempted to 
live on it and have subsequently abandoned it and resumed
3their nomadic habits." In his study of the implementation 
of the Dawes Act, D. S. Otis cited numerous instances of the 
failure of allotment of Indian lands since 1835. "Where 
Indians had the right of selling their lands," he said, "it 
was the nature of things that those lands should slip from
4their grasp." Since most Indian peoples had been hunters 
or herders, they had not developed a concept of landed 
property and were not interested in becoming individualized
5citizens or farmers. But even though treaties were still 
being made with Indian nations until 1871, it had been clear 
since early in the nineteenth century "that as Indian power 
declined the United States would choose to treat the native 
American in his individual rather than in his collective
•4. ..6capacity.
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As the 1880s began, Prucha notes, the great migration
of White settlers westward and the coincident desire for
religious unification in the United States combined to give
7new energy to the movement for Indian assimilation. With
White towns and homesteads touching the borders of the
Indian reservations, Christian evangelicals sought to extend
their idea of individual salvation to the Indian. Reformers
felt too that the only way Indians could join the rest of
American society in overcoming its problems was as
individuals in monogamous family groups, rather than as
communal members of polygamous tribes.
To promote this end Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Ezra A. Hayt began the legislative process early in 1879
which would result eight years later in America's first
allotment law applicable, with a few exceptions, to all
Indian tribes. To protect the Indians from pa-st abuses,
Hayt proposed that the government hold each allotment in
trust for twenty-five years to give the Indians time to
become educated for citizenship and prepare to hold their
lands in fee. Some tribes, like the Omahas, agreed with
Hayt that individual landholdings would at least protect
them against the onslaught of White settlers, which the
8government was unable or unwilling to stop.
The idealistic church orientation of the Indian 
Bureau during Grant's Peace Policy reverted back to politics
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as usual in the 1880s and beyond. During the early
reservation years, westerners hungry for Indian land were
at odds with eastern churchmen and reformers who believed
the tribes had to be protected in their isolation while they
slowly learned the arts of civilization. As the Christian
denominations lost their strong influence in Indian affairs,
eastern and western interests came together over the idea of
assimilation. White settlers west of the Missouri River
rejoiced to hear the friends of the Indian become committed
to forcing the tribes to sell their surplus land in order to
accelerate their adaptation to civilized ways. This
coalescence of means among groups with such different ends in
9mind, moved the Dawes Act towards its final passage in 1887.
In January and February of 1881 a general severalty 
bill introduced by Senator Richard Coke of Texas was hotly 
debated on the Senate floor.^ The Coke bill received 
enthusiastic support from Secretary of the Interior Carl 
Schurz, successive commissioners of Indian affairs, the
Board of Indian Commissioners, and various Indian rights
organizations. Its major provisions were that when the
President decided that a reservation was suitable for
agricultural purposes he could order the issuing of
allotments of land in severalty as follows:
. . . 160 acres to the head of a family, 80 acres to 
single persons over eighteen years of age, 40 acres to 
orphans under eighteen, and 20 acres to other children. 
The sale of excess lands to the government was to be
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negotiated with the tribes. The allotment of the 
reservation could be made only with the consent of two- 
thirds of the males of the tribe over twenty-one years 
of age; and the allotments were to be inalienable for 
twenty-five years. Once the allotments had been made, 
the laws of the state or territory in which the Indians 
lived would govern the Indians. The bill did not apply 
to the Five Civilized Tribes, which consistently opposed 
the measure.11
The Coke bill also contained a provision which gave
individual Indians the right to take allotments whenever
they wanted to, but required the consent of two-thirds of the
12adult males to apply allotment to the whole tribe.
But the flood of White settlers had become so frantic 
by the 1880s that the Indian could no longer be allowed the 
luxury of adapting gradually to White culture. Totally 
against obtaining the consent of the Indians in this matter 
was the Congregational minister Lyman Abbott. He told a 
gathering of reformers at Lake Mohonk in New York "that the 
reservation system is hopelessly wrong; that it cannot be 
amended or modified; that it can only be uprooted, root, 
trunk, branch and leaf, and a new system put in its place."
"I would begin at once," Abbot said, "a process for the
13survey and allotment of land to individuals in severalty."
Taking a more moderate stand on this issue was the
man whose name was attached to the final measure, Senator
Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts. Dawes had been a member
of Congress since 1857 and a leading liberal reformer for
14the cause of Indian rights. In a letter to Interior
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Secretary Henry M. Teller in September 1882, Dawes stated
his agreement with allotment in theory, but expressed some
misgivings about putting it into practice. He doubted
whether the majority of Indians who did not speak or write
English, who did not want to work or make money, and who did
not understand our laws or system of courts could survive 
15on their own. Just over a year later though, either with 
his doubts resolved or through pressure from his constituency 
to hurry the Indians' independence, Dawes emphasized 
"civilizing" the Indian rather than protecting him from 
undue exploitation.' He introduced his own bill in the Senate 
early in 1886, and it became law a year later.
The Coke bill and the Dawes Act were essentially the 
same, except for an important shift which evolved during the
1880s over the issue of obtaining Indian consent. Reformers
(had accepted the threat of force as a tolerable tool m
convincing the Indians to agree to allotment, therefore the
requirement of obtaining two-thirds consent among the males
17was excluded from the Dawes Act. The bill allowed the 
President at his discretion to allot 40 to 160 acres to each 
Indian on a reservation, with good agricultural and grazing 
land, without the consent of the tribe. If after four years 
from the President's order individuals had not chosen their 
allotments, the Indian agent or a special agent was to make 
it for them. Once the allotment was approved by the
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secretary of interior, he would issue a patent to the land 
which was to be held in trust by the government for twenty- 
five years. The surplus land which remained after allotments 
were made would be sold to the government and the land would 
then be opened to homesteaders. The money paid to the 
Indians for their surplus land was to be used for the 
education or "civilization" of the specific tribe as Congress 
saw fit. The act granted American citizenship to any Indian 
who took an allotment, who was either born in the United 
States or was living in a "civilized" manner away from his 
or her tribe. All Indians who became citizens under the act 
were then subject to the civil and criminal laws of the state 
or territory in which they lived. Special agents were 
appointed by the President to survey the reservations and 
make allotments, with the assistance of the specific Indian
4. 1 8agent.
With the passage of the Dawes Act the Indian Rights
Association and other reform groups rejoiced in their victory.
They rated that moment of freedom for the Indian with
"Runnymede and Magna Charta, Independence and Emancipation,"
19and hoped it would become a national holiday. Although 
President Cleveland wanted to apply the act gradually, after 
seven months Senator Dawes announced with alarm that the
"landgrabbers" had already pressured the President into
20 . . .  alloting six reservations. Indeed, said historian D. S.
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Otis, "The application of allotment to the reservations was
21characterized by extreme haste." In 1881 there were 
155,632,312 acres of reservation land belonging to the 
Indians, by 1890 there were 104,314,349 acres, and by 1900 
only 77,865,373 acres were left.^
Santee and Yanktonais Sioux
The reformers demonstrated their naivete concerning the
real problems on the Indian reservations by the way they
dropped out of the reform organizations soon after the
allotment act was signed. "Instead of realizaing that the
Dawes Act added to their responsibilities," said Loring
Benson Priest, "most members of Indian associations
23considered their work was ended." Agent John W. Cramsie 
of the Devils Lake Agency, could have used their continued 
help in Congress to obtain the minimum aid he thought 
necessary to carry on the serious efforts his Indians were 
making toward self support.
The Sioux of Devils Lake tried to expand their wheat 
farming operations throughout the 1880s. In the first half 
of the decade, surrounding White communities prospered and 
served as markets for the Indians' surplus wheat crop. By 
the 1890s, drought and economic depression drove many Whites 
out and the Sioux were left to subsist as before. Since 
so many Indians were already living on allotments, the
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passage of the Dawes Act was very welcome to the agent, who 
overcame the tribe's initial objections. For Cramsie, 
allotment was the key to Indian independence from government 
wardship. But the interest shown by reformers in the 1880s 
waned in the following years and the dream of Indian 
assimilation seemed further and further away.
Article 5 of the Santee Sioux Treaty of 1867 called 
for the allotment of 160 acres to each family head or person 
over twenty-one years old "who may desire to locate
2permanently and cultivate the soil as a means of subsistence. 
If fifty acres of the allotment had been fenced, plowed, and 
planted after five consecutive years of occupation, an 
inalienable patent would be issued. While patents had not 
been issued at Devils Lake after twnety years, over half of 
the Sioux families were doing some farming and living on 
allotments.
So it was with great enthusiasm that Cramsie responded
in August 1887 to a circular letter from the "Department,”
requiring agents to chart the course by which their Indians
would become civilized and able to support themselves "by
25agriculture as soon as possible." "The first solid step 
necessary" to accomplish this end, the agent said, . . .  is 
to make allotments of land in severalty to the Indians, . . ." 
But this alone would not be a cure-all. Cramsie felt that 
if Congress made sure they were supplied with the proper
132
farm animals, equipment, and good agency farmers, the Indians
could make themselves self-supporting in from four to six
years. Speaking candidly, he said that without the support
of Congress and a good agent all the "flowery, philanthropic,
sentimental, and theoretical rules and laws for the
elevation of the poor red man, . . . will be money spent and
time wasted." ̂ ®
All Cramsie could do was annually remind the
commissioner of the needs of the Devils Lake Sioux, and
27carry on with whatever resources were at hand. In 1887 he
eagerly began alloting farms, but had to stop when he
learned that a special agent was required for the work.
When Malachi Krebs arrived two years later to do the work,
Cramsie and his people were well prepared. The agent had
already surveyed the reservation and had made copies of the
Dawes Act, translated into "the Sioux language," so the
Indians would understand what was happening to them.
The Indians' response revealed much old business that
needed resolving before they would allow the official
break-up of their tribal relations. They claimed that as
a consequence of the 1862 outbreak in Minnesota, which
according to them was the work of other Sioux bands, they
were never paid money due them under the Treaty of Traverse
28des Sioux of 1851. They also cited the admission by the 
government that they were to be compensated for 64,000 acres
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of the best land on their present reservation, which had
mistakenly been left outside the western boundaries and was
subsequently settled by Whites. And they wanted payment for
the right-of-way they had granted to the Jamestown Northern
Railroad six years previous. With this tradition of not
honoring treaties and agreements, Cramsie sensed their
underlying fear of
. . . taxation, the white man's laws and citizenship, 
which would render them liable to arrest and punishment 
by the white men's laws, which they know nothing about; 
that the white men are anxious to get possession of 
their lands, and that the law would be enforced for 
every trivial offense for the purpose of driving them 
out of the country with this end in v i e w . 29
If these old debts were taken care of, the Sioux felt they
could buy the stock and machinery necessary to succeed in
farming. Cramsie shared many of the misgivings his charges
had concerning the unresponsiveness of Congress to their
present needs. Nevertheless, he did his duty as a
representative of .the government and "met all the objections
and explained the many advantages that would accrue to them
by being citizens."^  .
With the opposition apparently quieted and a new special
agent, Joseph R. Gray, on the job, allotment of about
100,000 acres of the 166,400 acres on the reservation was
completed by the end of 1891. Agent John W. Waugh spoke
very highly of the job Gray was doing in alloting the head
of every family "some timber, some meadow, and some plow
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land." He was hopeful that in just a few years "the ideal 
of a small farm" would become a reality for all the Indians 
of Devils L a k e . ^
In 1892, with allotment still not quite completed and 
the third special agent on the job, Waugh observed:
The Indians are all very well satisfied at the 
results of taking their land in severalty, and great 
good to them must follow by fixing them in a permanent 
place which they can call home, and which has 
heretofore been embraced in the one work "tipi," the 
location of it being changed from one part of the 
reservation to another every season. It was almost 
impossible to have the majority of them remain long 
enough in a place to make any permanent improvements, 
but since they have taken their lands in severalty 
they are appreciating the necessity of trying to live 
like the white m a n . 32
By the end of 1892, 1,132 allotments were completed
and the patents were issued in April 1893. The next year,
4,000 of the 80,000 tillable acres on the reservation were
being cultivated by 270 families located on their allotments.
Because of the hot July winds that had been prevalent for
the last few years, the 3,000 acres planted to wheat
produced only 12,000 bushels and brought less than forty
33cents per bushel at the grain elevators. In 1885, for
example, families on 200 allotments covering 3,000 acres
produced 40,000 bushels of wheat at fifty-five cents per 
34bushel. Certainly more families living on individual 
allotments did not guarantee a better life.
In 1893, Agent Ralph Hall discovered that at least 
half of the Devils Lake Sioux were living on parched corn
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and wild turnip roots. One old man told Hall that in the
future he would only raise potatoes and corn since they
usually provided him with something to eat. He said wheat
was either a failure, or when he did manage to raise a good
crop it all went to pay his debts. In sum, the agent thought
that only about seven to ten percent of the families on the
reservation were totally independent, and that this would
not iinprove until the older, nonprogressive Indians had died
off and were replaced by the more educated and secularized 
35youth.
Hall's annual report for 1895 appears unreliable in a
few particulars. Although the harvest had not been completed,
he estimated that 3,000 acres of wheat would produce 54,000
bushels, more than four and a half times greater than the
previous year. He also applauded the efforts of his Indian
police and Court of Indian Offenses for preventing the
performance of grass dances and medicine feasts, which he
3 6claimed had been rampant five to ten years earlier.
These findings are in conflict with those of Inspector
James McLaughlin who, we have already noted, visited Devils
Lake at this time and found a total breakdown in the
discipline that he and John Cramsie had maintained during
the previous twenty years. According to Pfaller, McLaughlin
found dancing and polygamy being permitted by
"nonprogressive" police and judges, and encouraged Hall to
37replace these men with the more "progressive" element.
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In 1897, his last year as agent, Hall felt similar to 
Cramsie eight years earlier. He cited the parsimony of the 
government in keeping eight "partially educated" young men 
dirt poor on their allotments. Without the necessary tools 
and animals they could not farm, and there was little day 
labor to be had on the reservation. He thought that unless 
they received immediate assistance, they would remain
3 8forever "dependent upon the charity of the Government."
The story was the same throughout the rest of the
decade. Although 24 0 families were living in log houses in
1897, by 1900 the number living on and cultivating their
39allotments had fallen from 285 to 252. Only 109 of the
235 children were enrolled in school and the $10,000 in
1895, served only as "direct relief and did little more than
40keep them alive from year to year."
To the end of the century the Devils Lake Reservation
remained dominated by the will of the agent. The annual
reports are conspicuously void of any mention of the actions
of individual Indians. It is almost as grim as the
depiction of the reservation Indian by a later commissioner
of Indian affairs, Francis E. Leupp: "Nothing was demanded
of the Indians in return except that they obey their Agents
41and keep quiet." How quiet the Sioux actually were is 
hard to determine; their religious leaders were probably 
trying to maintain a sense of tribalism amid the despair.
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Soon after the Dawes Act was passed Senator Dawes said:
If the Mohonk people, and those who have sent them here, 
shall feel that they have done their duty and have 
accomplished their work by simply enacting such a law 
as this, they have brought upon the Indian a calamity 
instead of a blessing.42
Living in a hostile environment which had defeated many
White farmers and having been misunderstood and abandoned
by the federal government, the Indians of Devils Lake must
have taken some long backward glances as they stepped into
the twentieth century.
Cheyennes and Arapahoes 
The tribes of Indian Territory were not included in 
the Dawes Act, so a special commission was appointed in 1889 
to negotiate for the surplus lands there. The Cheyennes and 
Arapahoes had not fared well in the 1880s; after the Dog 
Soldiers drove out the cattlemen the Indians did some 
farming, but essentially they remained in their camps living 
off rations and annuities. The Arapahoes were eager to 
farm, but the arid climate and the intransigence of the 
Cheyenne Dog Soldiers made that very difficult. By the end 
of the decade increased interest in peyote and the Ghost 
Dance disrupted all farming operations. The Cheyennes 
continued to resist change in their talks with the Jerome 
Commission, but a few of them, along with most of the 
Arapahoes, felt that it was time to try a new road. At the
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mercy of a stingy Congress and a stern and inflexible Indian
agent, the 1890s became a disaster for these two tribes.
White interest in Indian Territory grew throughout the
1880s, as the rest of the Trans-Mississippi West was being
rapidly settled. The only Whites allowed there until 1889
were the employees of Indian agencies and cattlemen holding
grazing leases or permits with the tribes. Cattlemen
supported the Indians in opposing efforts by the railroads
in Congress to open the area to homesteaders. On the side
of the railroads were the regional business interests, who
joined the competition by hiring promoters called "Boomers"
to rally the cause for the opening of what one of their
43leaders labeled the "New Canaan." Their plans were aided
by an article written in the February 17, 1879 issue of the
Chicago Times by the Cherokee attorney for them, Elias C.
Boudinot. In it he claimed that 14 million acres in western
Indian Territory were part of the public domain and should
44be opened to homeseekers.
During the 1880s the Boomers made numerous "raids" 
into central Indian Territory, only to be driven out by 
the United States cavalry from Fort Reno and other posts. 
These actions gave them valuable newspaper coverage and 
drew the attention of a number of Congressmen who supported 
the opening of the area to White settlement. An opening 
wedge was finally achieved with the Springer Amendment, a
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rider attached to the 1889 Indian Appropriation Bill. The
Springer Amendment called for the opening of the Unassigned
Lands, an area just east of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation.
It also empowered the President to appoint a commission to
negotiate with the tribes for the sale of their surplus
lands. Once these lands were ceded they would become part
45of the newly established Oklahoma Territory.
The group authorized by President Benjamin Harrison
to negotiate land cession agreements with the tribes of
Indian Territory Was called the Cherokee, or Jerome,
Commission. It included David H. Jerome, former governor of
Michigan, Wayne G. Sayre of Indiana, and Judge Alfred M.
Wilson of Arkansas. Over a period of two and a half years
the commission negotiated eleven agreements, which were
ratified by Congress, for over 15 million acres. They came
46to the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation in the summer of 1890.
Prior to that some of the Indians' former agents and 
attorneys tried to cut themselves in on the payments for any 
land cessions the Indians would make to the government.
This group included John D. Miles, D. B. Dyer, and G. E. 
Williams. According to the account given by Berthrong, 
these men took a few of the more educated Indians and select 
tribal leaders, like the Cheyenne Little Chief and the 
Arapaho Left Hand, to Oklahoma City to entertain them and 
reawaken their interest in selling their share of the
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Cherokee Outlet, which they had vacated, but never formally
47ceded to the United States. Under very questionable 
circumstances these friends of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes 
persuaded them to sell their interest in the Cherokee Outlet 
for $1.25 an acre, with a ten percent commission for their 
services. The final contract, approved by Secretary of 
Interior John W. Noble, allowed Miles, Dyer, and attorneys 
Matt Reynolds and Samuel J. Crawford to be paid a percentage 
of any lands the government would buy from the Indains.
When the Jerome Commission arrived at Darlington 
on July 7, 1390, another group of Indians lost their 
lands. All the necessary conditions were present: the
tribes had been divided into contending factions, key 
chiefs had been deceived by their supposed friends, the 
Indian policy of allotment required implementation, 
land-hungry whites were waiting for the reservation to 
be opened for settlement, and easy money was waiting 
for white spoilsmen.48
Agent Ashley gathered the Cheyenne and Arapaho leaders 
to talk with the commissioners. The traditionalist Cheyenne 
chief Old Crow set the tone for most of his tribe when he 
said:
The Great Spirit gave the Indians all this country and 
never tell them that they should sell it. . . . See, I 
am poor. I have no money; I don't want money; money 
doesn't do an Indian any good. Here is my wealth 
[pointing to the ground]. Here is all the wealth I 
want— the only money I know how to keep.'*
Little Big Jake, Spotted Horse, Young Wirlwind, Wolf Face,
and Little Medicine all agreed that the Cheyennes did not
want to sell their land. Sergeant Meat and Little Man
recalled being told by General Sheridan in 1885 to retain
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control of their reservation no matter what. Although the 
Springer Amendment and not the Dawes Act was being used to 
gain these land cessions, the commissioners freely invoked 
their ability to force the Indians to accept allotments 
under the Dawes Act if they refused to accede to their more 
liberal offer.^
Despite the intractable Cheyennes, there were a few 
under Cloud Chief, and most of the Arapahoes who followed 
Left Hand, who were willing to negotiate. Over two weeks 
of talks in July 1890 and one more week in October, the 
terms reached by the Jerome Commission with the Indians were 
as follows: The Cheyennes and Arapahoes ceded the Cherokee
Outlet and all land in Grant’s 1869 Presidential Proclamation 
reservation except their allotments. Every tribal member 
was alloted 160 acres, half in farmland and half in grazing 
land; these choices had to be made within ninety days of 
Congressional approval of the agreement or the choice of 
allotments would be made by the alloting agent. Allotments 
were inalienable for twenty-five years in accordance with 
the Dawes Act. The Indians were paid $1.5 million (about 
$.50 an acre) for their surplus land (out of 4,294,415 
acres, 3,764,723 acres were considered surplus once 
allotments were completed); $500,000 of that would be 
distributed in two per capita payments, the first would be 
sixty days after Congressional approval. One million dollars
142
remained on deposit in the United State Treasury earning 
five percent interest, distributed annually on a per capita 
basis. Also, the Cheyennes and Arapahoes would continue to 
receive their annuities under the Treaty of Medicine Lodge 
until 1897.51
According to the Treaty of Medicine Lodge, three- 
fourths of the adult males had to approve any land cessions. 
Before a final agreement could be reached, Chairman Jerome 
had to remove the former agents and attorneys from the 
council meetings because the Indians had repudiated them. 
However, they were allowed to charge their fees based on 
what the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were paid for the Cherokee 
Outlet. They used their influence and money to encourage 
the progressive Indians to obtain enough signatures to 
ratify the opening of the reservation. Agent Ashley decided 
he had the right number of signatures by November 13, 1890 
and despite a protest of his methods and numbers by 
traditional Cheyennes, Congress approved the agreement on 
March 3, 1891.52
It took a month for a required census to be completed 
and a year before all allotments were surveyed by the 
special agents. At first Old Crow, Young Whirlwind, Red 
Moon, White Shield and their bands desired to be allowed to 
live without money and allotments in the western part of 
the reservation. As time went by, many of their followers
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saw the fancy wagons, clothes, and sweets others were buying
with their silver dollars, and they too enrolled and took
53their allotments.
In early April 1892, when the pressure from homeseekers
to open the reservation was greatest, the chiefs who had led
the negotiations, Left Hand and Cloud Chief, protested that
not all of its stipulations had been met. But it was too
late to delay any longer. At "high noon" on April 19, the
3,210 member Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation was open to a run
54of 25,000-30,000 land-hungry settlers.
The shock of losing seven-eighths of their reservation
land to White settlers, whose "deep prejudice often
bordering on racism" allowed them to take advantage of the
Cheyennes and Arapahoes at every turn, prevented the move
55toward independence the government had hoped for. But
again, as with the Sioux of Devils Lake, the politicians and
reformers seemed to have reached a laissez-faire attitude
toward the Indian problem. Congress refused to allocate
the farm animals and machinery necessary to give these less
acculturated Indians a start in developing an agricultural 
5 6economy. And although Congress passed a law in 1891 
which allowed non-Indians to lease allotments from the 
Indians for a three year period, they refused to extend the 
time to five years when agents and settlers claimed three
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57years was unworkable. It was difficult enough for Congress 
to alter a law, let alone be flexible in its administration.
It is no wonder then that the annual reports of Major 
A. E. Woodson, who succeeded Agent Ashley in 1893 and 
served until the end of the century, reflect a profound 
frustration at the persistence of Indian cultural life.
Their preference for living in camps instead of on 
allotments, for visiting relatives and friends in other 
bands and tribes, their commitment to being generous with 
their property, for their religious beliefs and practices, 
and for their continued respect and adherence to the wisdom 
of their elders and spiritual leaders gave much anguish to 
the agent. Over thirty years these traits helped the 
Indians maintain their identities in the face of the 
ethnocentric and misguided policies of the United States 
government.
"The old habit of living in villages and bands," said
5 8Agent Woodson, "is difficult to overcome." In an effort
to remedy this he petitioned the commissioner in 1894, for
funds to increase the number of his police in order to
assist the military in forcing the Indians onto their
allotments. He also hoped to set up sub-agencies run by
White district farmers who could provide the equipment and
the assistance to get the Cheyennes and Arapahoes started
59as farmers on their allotments. Soon Woodson claimed to
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have most of his Indians living on their individual plots
of land located in ten farming districts, each with a White
farmer, an Indian farmer, a blacksmith, and a butcher. He
hoped these self-contained locations would induce the
6 0Indians to remain settled.
But while the Arapahoes were willing to work at 
farming, the Cheyennes rarely remained long on their 
allotments. "The most common and pernicious custom among 
them is the habit of visiting their relatives and friends 
and eating their substance."^ Agents were irked by this 
practice in the 1870s and continued to complain in the 
1890s:
Their lavish hospitality militates against the 
accumulation of wealth by individuals. . . . The visiting 
tribe is loaded down with presents that the donors can 
ill afford to bestow. Often the last pony or blanket 
will, in a fit of generosity, be given away, while 
frequently the party making the gift is in debt and 
owing more than he is able to pay.62
The agent gave permission to "progressive" Indians to visit
friends nearby who had been living on their allotments.
But he denied permission to a group of traditionalists who
6 3wanted to travel 500 miles to visit the Utes in Colorado.
In their own defense, the Indians pointed out that since
they were citizens they should be able to come and go as 
64they pleased.
Visiting also incurred the agent's wrath because under 
the influence of the "medicine men," the Indians held
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6 5ceremonies and dances for days on end. Young people, who 
had been educated by the government would drop their 
civilized pursuits and join the rest of the tribe in these 
celebrations. Woodson further believed that the spiritual 
leaders had a "retarding influence" on their people by 
keeping them from having their illnesses treated by the
6 6agency physician, which he felt led to a high death rate.
Besides the "medicine men," Woodson accused the older
chiefs and headmen for retarding the progress of their
people. "The fact that these chiefs are consulted in matters
pertaining to their people and are required to witness the
issues of rations, clothing, farming tools, and other
supplies seems to magnify their importance until they assume
an air of censorship and control over the Indians and agent 
6 7as well." He wanted the government to outlaw their
influence because, out of respect for them, the young
"progressive" Indians allowed them to dominate the councils
and other affairs at the agency. They were the ones who
perpetuated the traditional tribal relations that Woodson
6 8was trying so hard to destroy. Woodson received 
permission from Commissioner D. M. Browning to withhold 
rations and annuities from those chiefs, mostly Cheyennes, 
who he felt had not tried to make themselves independent of 
the government's generosity. By 18 97 the agent saw his 
efforts had succeeded: "the end is near, and the opposition
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69almost gone." The Cheyenne chiefs at Cantonment were still 
defiant, but only Thunder Bull of the Arapahoes offered any 
opposition.^
There was an even more conservative influence blocking
the Indians' road to civilization, according to Woodson.
It is quite evident that the Indian women are the least 
progressive; they cling more tenaciously to primitive 
customs than the men; they are wedded to old-time 
methods and their influence is retarding in many ways; 
they hold chiefs and medicine men in awe and are 
thoroughly superstitious.
Woodson hoped to increase his staff of field matrons, -who
could combat the traditional influence of the Indian mothers
over their daughters by teaching them the homemaking arts.
"The sarcasm and ridicule of the old squaws," he said,
prevented the young women from adopting more sanitary
methods of cooking, housekeeping, dressing, and caring for 
71the sick. He even blamed the women for keeping the Indians
from living on their allotments. "Their natural love of
company and gossip," and "their abhorrence of solitude"
72were what kept the camp alive. Woodson also blamed the
73wives and mother-m-laws for most family quarrels.
Woodson's annual reports reveal that most of the 
Cheyennes and Arapahoes were not supporting the allotment 
policy. After all, their previous experience with farming 
was very disappointing, ranching and leasing had not worked, 
and their educational and political development had not 
progressed to the point where they could survive without the
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government's help. But the government did not provide enough 
of the proper personnel or material for these experiments to 
have a chance to work. Woodson was aware of these 
shortcomings, but his commitment to making the Indian into 
a Christianized yeoman farmer never allowed him to question 
the policies themselves.
Instead of building trust, the Jerome Commission,
Agent Ashley, former agents and attorneys, intermarried 
Whites, and Indians of mixed ancestry combined to deceive 
the Cheyennes and Arapahoes into signing most of their 
reservation away. Throughout the 1890s, as the parsimony 
and neglect of the government increased, and the Indians 
were surrounded by eight to ten times their number of 
prejudiced White citizens, they reacted by holding fast to 
their tribalism. Agent Woodson then heaped blame on the 
"so-called chiefs" and "coffee coolers," the spiritual 
leaders, and the older women for keeping the young educated 
Indians from becoming like young White farmers.
When Agent George W. H. Stouch took over in 1900, he
found that only fifteen to eighteen percent of the adult
74males were farming their own allotments. From reading 
Woodson's published reports Stouch had expected to find 
almost all of the able bodied adult males involved in 
farming. This did not occur because Agent Woodson was more 
concerned with controlling his Indian wards rather than
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attempting to accomplish change through respectful diplomatic 
negotiations. It is a tribute to the Cheyenne and Arapaho 
people that they were able to retain their identity amidst 
such ethnocentric attitudes.
Kiowas and Comanches
The Kiowas and Comanches were the last tribes with 
whom the Jerome Commission had to negotiate for allotments 
and surplus lands before all of what had been Indian 
Territory was opened to non-Indian settlement. These 
Indians had recently seen the rush of homesteaders onto the 
lands of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes and were therefore 
feeling extremely cautious. Their relationship with Texas 
cattlemen over the last few years had provided some with 
enough money and land to become relatively prosperous and 
it provided others with the money to buy the tools and 
animals they needed to begin farming.
The Kiowas and Comanches negotiated and signed the 
Jerome Agreement in the fall of 1892 and applied enough 
pressure, along with the cattlemen, to forestall its approval 
by Congress until June 1900. In the meantime White settlers 
and local merchants used their influence with the Indians, 
agents, and politicians to press for the opening of the 
reservation as soon as possible. The eight year delay 
proved to be fortunate for the Indians, not only
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economically, but also for the assistance they received from 
two agents who tried to protect the Indians interests as 
they saw them. The reports of Agents Major Frank D. Baldwin 
and Lieutenant Colonel James F. Randlett reflect little of 
the racial prejudice of Agent A. E. Woodson of the Cheyenne- 
Arapaho agency. This helped the tribes prepare for the 
inevitable break-up of their lands.
The Jerome Commission met with the Kiowas, Comanches,
and Kiowa-Apaches at Fort Sill and Anadarko between
September 28 and October 17, 1892. In his opening statement
Chairman Jerome reminded the Indians of the great
opportunities for their future well-being in what they were
bargaining for: " . . .  the Government wants nothing from
you but that it gives you something that is a great deal
better for you than the land." Commissioner Sayre also
noted that after a hundred years of Indians living on
reservations and Whites living on farms, " . . .  the Indians
on reservations are and always have been poor and the white
75man living upon his farm is and always has been rich."
The Kiowas and Comanches, however, had to deal with 
the reality of what the opening of their.surplus lands to 
settlement by homesteaders would mean to them. Certainly 
in leasing their lands to cattlemen and their participation 
on the Indian police force and Court of Indian Offenses 
the Comanches and Kiowas showed more willingness to
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participate in reservation life than had the Cheyennes to 
the north. They also knew that under the Treaty of Medicine 
Lodge their reservation was guaranteed to them through 
1897.76
After signing their agreement with the Jerome
Commission, the Cheyennes and Arapahoes came down to Fort
Sill and sponsored a dance for the Kiowas. Iseeo, the
head of the Indian scouts at the fort, told the commission
that in return for the dance the Kiowas gave their visitors
ponies that they badly needed. He said:
The Cheyennes came to this military reservation and 
brought their wagons and fancy shawls, velvet blankets, 
and carriages, and told us that the money that the 
Great Father had given them was all gone— that the 
money they got was invested in these things. Now the 
wagons are old, being used very hard, and the velvet 
shawls will be worn out.77
The Kiowa Big Tree commented, "They are poor; they will be
poor in the future, they had made a mistake in selling
their country; that money was given them but it was all 
„ 78gone.
In discussing the matter with the other Indians, the
Comanche Quanah Parker urged the ones who were anxious to
sell to move slowly. " . . .  I want a thorough understanding
and I thought it would be better to wait until the
79expiration of the other treaty." The Kiowa chief Lone 
Wolf recalled the progress his people had made in sending 
their children to school where they were learning "to
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live like white people, and soon they will be civilized."
And because many people were building houses and making good
progress, ". . . we ask the commission not to push us ahead
8 0too fast on the road we are to take." On the other hand,
Lone Wolf was totally against allotments:
If each of us were given 160 acres we would not be 
able to work it like white people— a white man is 
taught from his youth up to work, we are not— and 
instead of this 160 acres being a blessing it will
be disastrous.81
In the years ahead Lone Wolf would remain vehemently opposed
to allotment, whereas Quanah was less against allotment than
he was opposed to the sale of their surplus lands to Whites.
After all, Quanah had done very well leasing grass to
cattlemen. The Indians generally supported Quanah's view,
hoping to become more economically secure on their allotments
82before opening the rest of the reservation.
Over the weeks of negotiations kind and harsh words
were exhchanged as the commissioners explained their offers
8 3and the Indians proposed counter-offers. The Kiowas and
Comanches were assisted by the usual coterie of attorneys,
agency traders, intermarried Whites, and Indians of mixed
ancestry. Their agent George D. Day encouraged the Indians
to include the latter group of "friends," which included
himself, in any deal they made with the Jerome Commission:
"I know that they do not want to part with them; that they
84wanted to share with them" Historian William T. Hagan has
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said that experience had proved that the best way to insure
approval of land cessions with the Indians was to include
people in them "who might favorably dispose the Indians
toward it." These "friends" were very active in the rush
to obtain the required three-quarters of the adult males to
85sign the agreement.
Quanah led the Comanches in the meetings. On October
5, when he demanded $2.5 million for their surplus land
(the commission offered $2 million), he even gained the
support of Lone Wolf. The commissioners agreed to leave
the $2 million figure in the agreement and let Congress
decide upon the higher figure. Like the Cheyennes and
Arapahoes, the Kiowas and Comanches would each receive 160
acres, half in farmland and half in grazing land, their
payment for their surplus land would earn five percent
annually, the interest to be distributed on a per capita
basis. The first $500,000 would be distributed in three
per capita payments, with five percent interest over two 
86years.
The last few days of the negotiations were held at 
Anadarko where most of the Kiowas lived. The agreement 
was strongly opposed by Big Tree and Apiatan. Nevertheless, 
the commissioners obtained 456 out of 562 adult male 
signatures with relative ease. Some Kiowas asked that 
their signatures be removed, but this was not allowed.
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Other Indians blamed Kiowa interpreter Joshua Givens for
misleading them. But with Quanah supporting the agreement,
disunity among the Indians, the threat of the commissioners
to enforce the more strigent terms of the Dawes Act, and
the active promotion of twenty-five "friends" living on
the reservation, there were not many who could withstand the
87pressure to sign.
Since Quanah and other leaders who were benefiting 
from their relationships with the cattlemen came to feel
t
that the government was going to get their land eventually,
they threw their weight behind the Jerome Agreement. With
the support and influence of the cattlemen they worked for
a higher price per acre than the commission offered, larger
allotments, and made an intensive lobbying effort to delay
Congressional approval of the measure for as long as 
8 8possible. When Congress ratified the agreement eight 
years later it had been modified to include a 480,000 acre
tract of land that the Indians could hold in common, but they
were paid only $2 million for their surplus land at four
a. • 4. 4- 89percent interest.
Meanwhile, the Kiowas and Comanches were the most
prosperous in the years before allotment finally came. In
1890 Agent Adams could still say "Agriculture is the
90principal industry." By 1892 Agent Day noted that although 
farms and stockraising among his Indians was going well,
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grazing leases had become the best source of income. That
year he led a contingent including Quanah, Lone Wolf, and
the Kiowa-Apache White Man to Washington to gain support
for an expanded leasing program. They came away with the
government's sanction to make yearly leases of their
surplus land to cattlemen, which Day enthusiastically
91predicted would bring in $100,000 annually. In 1900 the
Indians of the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation earned $232,000 
92on leases. Between 1885 and 1906 grass money totalled
93over $2 million, confirming Day's prediction.
In his first annual report in 1895, Agent Major Frank
D. Baldwin observed that only the elderly seemed to be
against an attachment to property and hard work. But the
issue was more complex than that. Baldwin pointed out that
the Comanches, led by the positive influence of Quanah
Parker, "are the most progessive and industrious of the
94three bands, . . . "  However, the Kiowas were m  constant 
turmoil, he said, because "nearly all of them want to be 
chiefs." Further, in his opinion the Kiowa-Apaches were 
hopeless because they were so "indolent and shiftless."
The latter two tribes "have got to be made to work or 
starve," Baldwin said.
The agent also was disturbed by the influence of 
"traders and speculators" as to how the Indians spent their 
funds. These men opposed a decision made by the Indians to
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spend $50,000 of their grass payments on young heifers in
95order to build up their cattle herds. It was $50,000
out of their pockets. During his four years at Anadarko,
Baldwin was not afraid to use his police to confront the
traders and other Whites who were ever present to take
96advantage of the Indians' growing propserity.
Under Baldwin's term as agent the number of Indians
who benefited from this new prosperity grew. One of the
main reasons for this was the" government's 1891 decision to
allow more leasing than ever before. This was a clear
deviation from the Dawes Act, which sought to protect the
Indians' land from alienation for a twenty-five year period,
97during which they could become independent farmers.
Since most of their land was unfit for farming and the
government did not supply them with enough cattle to eat and
build herds of their own, the Kiowas and Comanches chose to
lease their grazing land to cattlemen. Stable relations
of long standing with cattlemen, and the favors they
bestowed, made them preferred leasing customers over the
9 8itinerant Whites. Another reason for increased grass 
payments to the Kiowas and Comanches was Baldwin's ruling 
that an Indian or a squaw man (intermarried White) could 
hold only ten acres for each head of stock he owned, with 
a maximum of 5,000 acres. The herds owned by people such 
as George W. Conover and Quanah Parker, who held 36,640 and
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44,000 acres respectively, were greatly reduced. By 1898,
Baldwin had again helped to raise the tribes' income by
getting the leases extended from one year at $.06 an acre,
99to three years at $.10 an acre.
The agent supported his Indians' view that the Senate 
should not confirm the Jerome Agreement. They had seen its 
unfortunate effects among the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and other 
tribes, when thousands of greedy Whites suddenly invaded 
their lands. "No bands of Indians have ever been able to 
cope with the whites," Baldwin said, "and when thrown among 
them they invariably have dwindled down to almost nothing, 
becoming a degraded, begging class." Instead of opening 
up their reservation to "men who have no friendship for the 
Indian," the Kiowas and Comanches, according to Baldwin, 
preferred to make their surplus lands available to other 
Indian p e o p l e s . I n  1897, the confederated tribes 
suggested adding 50,000 acres of their land to the Fort Sill 
Military Reservation for Geronimo's band of Apaches, and 
selling 160 acre allotments to some Wyandots searching for 
a new place to settle. But, as Hagan has said, Congress 
was more interested in providing.room for White settlers, 
and would not seriously consider the matter of the Apaches 
and the Wyandots.
From 1897 to 1900 the Kiowas and Comanches had three 
different agents, and they all remarked how civilized and
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industrious many of them had become, especially in comparison
102to most White frontier families. A sign of their improved
attitudes was their desire to live in houses. Agent Willaim 
T. Walker, a former Oklahoma newspaperman, said in 1898 that 
600 houses had already been built on the reservation. The 
government provided the materials and the Indians paid $50 
for the labor in constructing the house. In 1900 Agent 
Lieutenant Colonel James F. Randlett said that over 100 
houses had been built over the last year and that in each
i
case the Indians had chosen to build where they would have
once an allotment act was finally passed for them. Randlett
had encouraged them to make these choices, for he knew
allotment was not far off. He said:
. . . while all have experienced sorrow that no hope 
could be encouraged that the event could be delayed 
until the people generally were prepared intelligently 
to accept such conditions with advantage, it has been 
evident, that they were endeavoring to profit by the 
advice given.103
On June 6 , 1900 allotment finally came for the Kiowas, 
Comanches, and Kiowa-Apaches. Within a year the land was 
surveyed and alloted, and in the summer of 1901, 13,000 
White homesteads were opened through an organized lottery, 
instead of a chaotic run.^"^ For the next few years the 
Indians' income came mostly from leases to cattlemen on the
480,000 acres the agreement of 1900 left to the Indians in 
common. They also received payments from the sale of their
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surplus lands, and rent money from their allotments. 
Generally, White renters lived in the houses, while the 
Indians went back to living in camps as they used to.'*'^
The evidence suggests that three factors occurred
simultaneously in the 1890s to provide some short term
propserity for the people of this reservation. The
independent, individualistic spirit of the Comanches seems
to have allowed them to adapt more easily to reservation
life. The urgent need of the cattlemen for grazing land
gave a few Comanches the opportunity to attain wealth and
prestige among Indians and Whites. Agents Baldwin and
Randlett were flexible and sincere in protecting the
interests of their charges, which provided the positive
milieu for Indians and cattlemen to form stable, long-term
relationships. Just as the Cheyennes influenced the
Arapahoes, the Comanches may have encouraged the Kiowas to
make their own accommodations within the reservation milieu.
Although the Kiowa leader Apiatan finally joined Quanah in
support of the Jerome Agreement, Lone Wolf continued to lead
a small contingent against it after 1900. By 1910 the
Comanches were no closer to being farmers than they ever 
106were.
After two decades of adjustment to reservation living, 
American Indians were confronted with the prospect of the 
break-up of their tribal relations and the sale of most of
160
their land to non-Indians. The fight to pass an allotment
bill had finally created a consensus among eastern and
western White interests. The westerners got the land they
always wanted and the easterners were satisfied with
protecting the Indians' title to individual allotments and
exposing them to the good influence of industrious White
107yeoman farmers.
The Indians of each of the three reservations under 
study opposed allotment based on their previous experiences 
with the government. The Devils Lake Sioux felt that the 
government had not upheld its treaties and agreements with 
them over the previous forty years. They were also afraid 
of becoming subject to the White mans' laws, which they did 
not understand. Among the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, Old 
Crow spoke for many of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes who were 
against the sale of their lands. However, chiefs such as 
Cloud Chief and Left Hand felt that the time had come to 
compromise with the Jerome Commission. Many Whites and 
persons of mixed ancestry who had worked with these people 
over the years, and who could profit from allotment 
encouraged these Indians to settle. Most Kiowas and 
Comanches were not against allotment, but were very afraid 
of selling their surplus lands to non-Indians. Seeing 
that their resistance to the Jerome Commission was useless, 
Quanah and others chose to use their powerful coalition
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with the Texas cattlemen to get the best terms possible and
delay the opening of the reservation as long as they could.
The eastern reformers dropped the Indian's cause
after the passage of the Dawes Act, and the agents' reports
are filled with disappointment at the lack of support from 
Congress. In addition, Agent Woodson of the Cheyenne- 
Arapaho Reservation blamed the traditional attitudes and 
habits of the spiritual leaders, chiefs, and especially the 
older women for retarding the progess of their people. On 
the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation, the one not alloted in the 
1890s, individual Indians were more successful than anywhere 
else. The whole tribe benefited from the $2 million 
generated through leases between 1885 and 1906. While the 
Kiowas and Comanches were better off than the other 
reservations during this period, they had little left once 
their lands were alloted and the cattlemen were gone. If 
anything, the Dawes Act served to destroy any independence 
the Indians of these three reservations had managed to 
attain.
Conclusion
The Indian agent of the post-Civil War era believed 
that the transformation of the Indian into a Christianized 
yeoman farmer was in the Indian's and the nation's best 
interest. This paper describes the Indian's response to
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the federal assimilation policy as not merely a reaction 
to that policy, but also as an effort to control the pace 
and kind of change that was taking place. That is to say 
traditional practices such as ceremonials, intertribal 
visiting, polygamy, and living together in camps were 
some of the ways the Indians chose to maintain self- 
determination in the face of the government's attempts to 
destroy their way of life. The clash of cultures and 
individuals on the reservation frontier produced the 
diversity of assimilation among the five tribes herein 
discussed.
Despite the agent's orders to establish farms on 
individual allotments, most Indians continued to live in 
isolated camps. They came to the agency for rations and 
annuities, but kept their children away from its schools. 
Years of training at the Carlisle Institute proved futile 
as returning students could not find enough jobs at the 
agency and were soon living in their parents' camps again. 
There the spiritual leaders, through the Ghost Dance, 
peyote ceremonials, and other rituals, sought to extend 
traditional forms of religious renewal into the reservation 
milieu. Besides the medicine men, Indian women seem to 
have been the keepers of the sacred traditions. The camps 
continued to be the center of traditional Indian life even 
after allotments of land in severalty were made.
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Indians continued to visit other camps and 
reservations, with or without the required passes, while 
hunting and stealing horses along the way. Agents watched 
incredulously as an Indian family in grief gave away all of 
its possessions. To them these were signs of the Indians' 
low position on the scale of civilization, and justified 
their continued efforts to transform them into individual­
ized farmers, stripped of their tribal identity.
While controlling the quantity and quality of change 
in this way, Indians responded to the agent's program in a 
manner suited to their individual and tribal needs.
Whether ranching, farming, leasing their land, tanning hides, 
freighting supplies, or serving as Indian policemen or 
judges on the Court of Indian Offenses, most tribesmen made 
accommodations in order to survive. The agents, however, 
valued these activities for their presumed power to deaden 
the qualities that made the Indian what he was so that he 
might enter American society as an acculturated White man.
We have seen this pattern on all five reservations.
Therefore it may be safe to generalize that under the 
conditions of the post-Civil War Indian reservations the 
persistence of tribal traditions gave Indians the strength 
to confront the government assimilation policy on their own 
terms, not as passive victims of the governments 
overwhelming power.
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